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PURE PRIVACY
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ABSTRACT—In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis began a storied
legal tradition of trying to conceptualize privacy. Since that time, privacy’s
appeal has grown beyond those authors’ wildest expectations, but its essence
remains elusive. One of the rare points of agreement in boisterous academic
privacy debates is that there is no consensus on what privacy means.
The modern trend is to embrace the ambiguity. Unable to settle on
boundaries, scholars welcome a broad array of interests into an expanding
theoretical framework. As a result, privacy is invoked in debates about
COVID-19 contact tracing, police body cameras, marriage equality, facial
recognition, access to contraception, loud neighbors, telemarketing calls, and
on and on. This “pluralistic turn” has made privacy popular, but this
popularity comes at a cost. Lacking precision, ubiquitous invocations of
privacy tend to cloud rather than clarify, raising the temperature of academic
and policy debates while generating little light.
This Article proposes a baseline definition of “privacy” to anchor legal
discourse. The definition responds to privacy skeptics by identifying a core
of pure privacy that can and should be protected. But it also pushes back on
privacy pluralists by insisting on the need for precision. In a post-pandemic
world, policymakers face powerful temptations to override longstanding
privacy protections and countervailing pressures to abandon lifesaving
policies in the face of vigorous privacy objections. Precisely identifying what
is at stake in these debates can help to clarify the difficult choices that will
shape the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal privacy discourse suffers from two related problems. The first is
theoretical. While legal doctrine, scholarship, and advocacy regularly invoke
the concept of “privacy,” there is no consensus about what privacy means.1
Without a clear definition, privacy lacks the necessary foundation for
theoretical development. For the legal discipline, which prides itself on
precision, this is a puzzling state of affairs. Decades ago, pioneering privacy
scholar Alan Westin insisted that “privacy must be defined rather than

1 See, e.g., PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY, at xiii (1995) (“In virtually all
philosophical and legal writing about privacy, authors begin by noting the difficulty in conceptualizing
their subject.”); JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3 (1992) (“[T]he literature lacks
an accepted account of privacy’s definition and value.”); David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs,
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 225 (2016) (noting “the ‘bewildering variety of meanings’ the concept has
accumulated”); Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1134 (2006)
(“[V]irtually all scholars agree that ‘privacy’ is a concept that has eluded definition despite innumerable
efforts . . . .”); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO.
L.J. 2029, 2040 (2001) (recognizing the “lack of clarity at the theoretical and normative roots of privacy
doctrine”); Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35 (1967) (critiquing “the
conceptual vacuum surrounding the legal notion of privacy”); sources cited infra note 3.
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simply invoked.”2 Today’s leading scholars proclaim that “[p]rivacy is too
complicated a concept to be boiled down.”3
Modern scholarship reflects this theoretical bloat. Instead of coalescing
around a definition, privacy scholars embrace a “pluralistic turn,”4 ushering
a wide array of interests into a “big tent” conception of privacy.5 Most
prominently, leading privacy scholar Daniel Solove contends that “there are
no clear boundaries for what we should or should not refer to as ‘privacy.’”6
Instead, “[w]e can determine whether to classify something as falling in the
domain of privacy if it bears resemblance to other things we similarly
classify.”7 Solove proposes a “taxonomy of privacy” that consists of “four
general categories of privacy problems with sixteen different

2 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 3 (1967); cf. Rebecca Green, Candidate Privacy,
95 WASH. L. REV. 205, 216 (2020) (describing Westin as a “‘founding father’ in the field of privacy law
and author of the seminal 1967 book Privacy and Freedom”); Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum,
Measuring Privacy: An Empirical Test Using Context to Expose Confounding Variables, 18 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 176, 186 (2016) (“Alan Westin’s vast contribution to privacy in research and public
policy cannot be overstated . . . .”).
3 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485 (2006); see also JUDITH
WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY 61 (1997) (“[I]t is not possible to give a unique, unitary
definition of privacy that covers all the diverse privacy interests.”); Anita L. Allen, Univ. of Pa. L. Sch.,
The Philosophy of Privacy and Digital Life: Presidential Address at the Eastern Division Meeting of the
American Philosophical Association (Jan. 9, 2019), in 93 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N 21, 30
(2019) (explaining how the author “eventually came to deemphasize the importance of definitions”); Julie
E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1911 (2013) (“Privacy is not a fixed condition
that can be distilled to an essential core, but rather ‘an interest in breathing room to engage in socially
situated processes of boundary management.’”); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J.
2087, 2087 (2001) (“Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory
dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be
usefully addressed at all.”).
4 Pozen, supra note 1, at 225 (coining this phrase and describing Solove’s work as “exemplary in this
regard”).
5 See Solove, supra note 3, at 485–86; cf. Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell, Tjerk Timan,
Ivan Skorvánek, Tomislav Chokrevski & Masa Galic, A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483,
488 (2017) (describing “Solove’s taxonomy” as “arguably the most-cited and best-known classification
in recent privacy literature”); David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1082 (2014) (noting “the popularity of
Solove’s suggestion that privacy is a diversity of things without any common essence”); M. Ryan Calo,
The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1139 (2011) (“In a series of influential articles and
books, Daniel Solove rejects the notion that privacy can or should be reduced to any one, or even multiple,
concept(s).”); Danielle Keats Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary Pragmatism and the Value of
Privacy in the Twenty-First Century, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1116 (2010) (embracing Solove’s
taxonomy and noting that “Solove’s analysis and proposed solutions to those problems have received
considerable attention from scholars, media, and the courts”); Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy
and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1457–58 (relying on “Solove’s[] ‘Taxonomy of
Privacy,’ which is a comprehensive, topical, and robust classification of privacy-invasive activities”).
6 Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 745, 759 (2007).
7 Id.
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subcategories.”8 The authors of a competing “typology of privacy” differ
with Solove on the appropriate name for the exercise (“typology” versus
“taxonomy”),9 but embrace his general approach. They scour the literature
to identify “eight primary ideal types of privacy”: “bodily, spatial,
communicational and proprietary (or property-based) privacy, . . .
intellectual privacy, decisional privacy, associational privacy and behavioral
privacy.”10 Like Solove, these authors believe a comprehensive
categorization “improve[s] our understanding of what privacy means in all
its variety.”11
There is nothing objectionable about efforts to categorize the wide
variety of ways people use the term “privacy.” The surprise in modern
privacy scholarship is the lack of dissent. Remaining complaints concern
values that have (somehow!) been left out of the privacy tent, not all the
divergent values that are allowed in.12 As one prominent scholar told me,
“one cannot be ‘against’ privacy” anymore.13 All that is left is to join the
party. That’s the second problem plaguing privacy discourse: privacy has
become too popular.
Legal scholars take full advantage of the unchallenged freedom to fit
more and more conceptions of privacy into this boundaryless theoretical
space. In the academic literature, people lose privacy when they are forced
to disclose intimate details about their lives14 or obliged to keep them secret;15
permitted to obtain information16 or blocked from doing so;17 forced to wear
clothes18 or take them off.19 Privacy means: “being free to choose who [we]
8

Id. at 757–58.
Koops et al., supra note 5, at 494 (“[T]here is a meaningful difference as to what typologies and
taxonomies classify.”).
10 Id. at 566–67.
11 Id. at 490.
12 See, e.g., Michael Froomkin & Zak Colangelo, Privacy as Safety, 95 WASH. L. REV. 141, 162–63
(2020) (critiquing Solove because “in the context of a lengthy and careful analysis of privacy harms, there
is very little express discussion of how the absence of privacy can put safety at risk”); Pozen, supra note
1, at 226 (“Solove might have added still more items to the list.”).
13 Author’s recollection of a private communication with the source.
14 See infra Section II.B.
15 See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1895 (2019) (“Being forced to
hide one’s sexual orientation or gender identity denies LGBTQ individuals sexual privacy.”).
16 REGAN, supra note 1, at 240 (proposing a “public value of genetic privacy” that “might necessitate
total restrictions on certain genetic tests”).
17 Id. at 232 (proposing a privacy right “of the public to access records about themselves”).
18 Citron, supra note 15, at 1895 (“Sumptuary laws violated sexual privacy by denying women the
choice of how much of their bodies to reveal to the public.”).
19 Cf. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673, 1676 (2017)
(“When a Muslim woman wears a head, face, or body covering, she can be practicing her religion, but
9

466

116:463 (2021)

Pure Privacy

want to interact with,” “freedom of bodily movement,” the ability to avoid
“being touched,” the unfettered “development of opinions and beliefs,”
“image management,” and “‘[b]eing oneself’ in public.”20 Privacy
“encompasses liberty, equality, freedom of bodily integrity, autonomy, and
self-determination.”21 Privacy is safety.22 Privacy is trust.23 “Privacy is
shorthand for breathing room to engage in the processes of boundary
management that enable and constitute self-development.”24 “Privacy
actually exists within our minds and souls. Privacy is the way we perceive
privacy. In other words, privacy is an internal illusion and it is intangible.”25
It was not always like this. Robust critiques of privacy, and particularly
its opacity, used to be common in academic discourse. In fact, privacy’s
pluralistic turn feeds right into these once-prominent “reductionist”
critiques.26 Leading reductionist Judith Thomson agreed with the privacy
taxonomists–typologists that those who invoke privacy refer to “a cluster of
rights,” but she claimed that this diffusion demonstrates that privacy is not a
distinct value at all.27 In 1975, Thomson contended, “[I]t is possible to
explain in the case of each right in the cluster how come we have it without
ever once mentioning the right to privacy.”28 Almost fifty years later,

may also be engaged in an act of performative privacy or modesty, registering her refusal to be the object
of social gaze.”).
20 See Koops et al., supra note 5, at 531, 567–68 (collecting these and other privacy interests).
21 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 975 (1991); cf. Sonia M.
Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 772 n.172 (2004) (explaining that “the concept of personhood helps define
the kinds of autonomy and liberty interests that are central to privacy”).
22 Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 12, at 141 (explaining “that in many cases privacy is safety”).
23 ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE
36 (2018) (arguing for a conception of “privacy-as-trust”); Suter, supra note 21, at 746–49 (similarly
emphasizing the centrality of trust to privacy).
24 Cohen, supra note 3, at 1906.
25 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, To Read or Not to Read: Privacy Within Social Networks, the Entitlement
of Employees to a Virtual “Private Zone,” and the Balloon Theory, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 82 (2014).
26 See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1980) (discussing
variations in reductionists who “are united in denying the utility of thinking and talking about privacy as
a legal right”).
27 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 295, 312–13 (1975); cf. Judith
DeCew, Privacy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2018/entries/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/4VHK-XNJG] (describing Thomson’s as “[p]robably the most
famous reductionist view of privacy”); Jeffrey M. Skopek, Untangling Privacy: Losses Versus Violations,
105 IOWA L. REV. 2169, 2186 (2020) (“While Solove’s approach to privacy is illuminating, it is important
to recognize that it maintains the distinctiveness of the concept of privacy by denying that it has any core
meaning.”).
28 Thomson, supra note 27, at 313; cf. Anita L. Allen, Synthesis and Satisfaction: How Philosophy
Scholarship Matters, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 343, 359 (2019) (“The intractable vagueness of
privacy thesis suits well the needs of privacy law opponents . . . .”).
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Thomson’s provocative challenge still resonates.29 Yet it is the academic
privacy skeptics who abandoned the field. What happened? Privacy
pluralism changed the game, turning ambiguity into a virtue, not a vice.
Privacy emerged undefined and undefeated.
Even for those who champion privacy, this popularity comes at a price.
Without a clear essence, privacy is often reduced to a slogan, generating
superficial sound bites for news coverage, legal briefs, and social-media
takes. Devoid of precision, privacy has become something we worry about
on the way to making decisions that are often based, whether we recognize
it or not, on other, more concrete considerations.30
Confusion about the meaning of privacy isn’t just an academic
dilemma. Each day’s headlines reveal the enormous stakes.31 In a postpandemic world in which individual choices reverberate through the
community, policymakers confront two opposing dangers. They face both
powerful temptations to override longstanding privacy protections and
countervailing pressures to abandon potentially lifesaving policies in the face
of vigorous privacy objections.32 These are the hard choices that will shape
our future. Yet there is little hope of getting the balance right if we cannot
define our terms.

29 See Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1044
(2018) (emphasizing an absent progress towards responding to Thomson’s critiques).
30 See infra Part IV.
31 See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Digital Surveillance Can Help Bring the Coronavirus Pandemic Under
Control—but Also Threatens Privacy, CONVERSATION (Apr. 9, 2020, 8:07 AM) https://theconversation.
com/digital-surveillance-can-help-bring-the-coronavirus-pandemic-under-control-but-also-threatensprivacy-135151 [https://perma.cc/X8VT-M7AG] (“The [COVID-19] pandemic is confronting
Americans with important questions about how much and what kinds of surveillance and tracking to
accept in support of better health, as well as a revitalized economy.”).
32 See id.; Natasha Singer, The Hot New Covid Tech Is Wearable and Constantly Tracks You, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/technology/virus-wearable-trackerprivacy.html [https://perma.cc/3LGX-ME5D]; Before We Use Digital Contact Tracing, We Must Weigh
the Costs, WASH. POST (May 1, 2020, 12:33 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
tech-firms-must-prove-that-digital-contact-tracing-is-worth-the-privacy-intrusion/2020/05/01/cbf19b8e7dc7-11ea-9040-68981f488eed_story.html [https://perma.cc/SE5E-WG34]; Natalie Kitroeff & Jessica
Silver-Greenberg, Airlines Refused to Collect Passenger Data that Could Aid Coronavirus Fight, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/business/coronavirus-airlines-contacttracing-cdc.html [https://perma.cc/DGV9-2URJ] (reporting that health officials efforts to introduce
contract-tracing requirements for the airline industry were “rebuffed,” in part because “Senate aides were
concerned about the privacy implications”); Thomas Fuller, How Much Should the Public Know About
Who Has the Coronavirus?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/
coronavirus-data-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/7JLJ-SDY5] (“In the perennial tug-of-war between
privacy and transparency in the United States, privacy appears to be winning in the coronavirus
pandemic.”).
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The good news is that there is much to build upon. A vast body of
scholarship contributes to the modern understanding of privacy. Much of
what is needed is just decluttering.33
The cluttered state of modern privacy discourse can be traced directly
to its origins in the “most influential law review article of all.”34 In 1890,
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published The Right to Privacy, widely
recognized as “the foundation of privacy law in the United States.”35 Scholars
and judges celebrate this work as the historic setting where “Warren and
Brandeis defined privacy as the ‘right to be let alone.’”36 Decades later when
the Supreme Court sought a new home for rights that are not explicitly
referenced in the Constitution, it seized upon the “right to be let alone,”
equating the concept with “a general right of privacy.” The cases unspooled
from there. The constitutional right to privacy became a cherished, if
controversial, protector of a variety of important liberties, ranging from
access to contraception to the choice of a marriage partner. Importantly,
scholars endorsed not just the rulings (understandable), but the Court’s
“privacy” label (unfortunate), expanding the generally understood contours
of the term. This seemingly innocuous step had important implications. It
made it difficult to deny a “privacy” home to other interests that occasionally
overlap with or bear “resemblance” to privacy.37 As definition became
impossible, scholars unfurled the big tent.
The strangest and least discussed aspect of this history is that little of it
follows from privacy’s fabled origins. In The Right to Privacy, Warren and
Brandeis identified a broad umbrella right, “the more general right of the
individual to be let alone,”38 from which they derived a narrow privacy right.
They did not equate the two.39 Almost universally missed by judges and
scholars,40 that distinction was critical. The right to be let alone, which, as
Warren and Brandeis noted, includes such things as protection from assault,41
cannot be a definition of privacy. It is far too broad. And it parallels a

33 Cf. Richards, supra note 1, at 1140 (“The real challenge for scholarship falling in this category
going forward will be to bring some coherence to the field.”).
34 Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966); see also sources cited infra note 63.
35 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099–1100 (2002); see
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 (1890).
36 Solove, supra note 35, at 1100 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 193); see infra Part
I.
37 Solove, supra note 6, at 759.
38 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 205; see infra Part I.
39 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 205–06.
40 For a collection of these errors, see infra Part I and the sources cited infra note 65.
41 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 205.
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different, more fitting concept that, unlike privacy, appears in the
Constitution’s text. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself once characterized
some of the same rights now described as privacy as part of “the right of the
individual to his personal liberty.”42 In its more recent opinions, the Court
appears to be steering back to this rhetorical path, increasingly framing
substantive due process rights in terms of liberty, not privacy.43
As the Supreme Court relinquishes the term, modern scholars looking
to add rigor to privacy discourse can revisit its legal roots. Warren and
Brandeis sought to prevent public disclosure of private facts.44 That is the
rough core of privacy. Before the Court intervened, scholars were on their
way to a privacy definition that hewed close to that core. In 1967, Westin
proposed the following definition: “Privacy is the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others.”45 Although
increasingly overshadowed by big-tent privacy, Westin’s “conception of
privacy as control over personal information” is the “dominant” alternative.46
For those seeking a concrete “privacy” definition, control-ofinformation is the logical step after Warren and Brandeis. But two flaws in
Westin’s proposal prevent it from serving as a viable baseline privacy
definition. First, Westin and others who adopt an information-control
definition define the wrong thing. Control of information is not privacy. It is
a means of ensuring privacy.47 Westin defined a kind of right to privacy, not
privacy itself. Second, even recast as a right, control over personal
information doesn’t quite work.48 The right and the thing protected should
exhibit a direct relationship. When we invoke a right to privacy, privacy
should result. But invocations of a right to control information can lead to
the opposite of privacy, especially when the same information concerns more
than one person. For example, I can exercise control over my personal
information to publish intimate details of my life, even over the objections
of my family. That is no one’s understanding of privacy. As this Article
explains, a right to privacy is not broadly concerned with the control of
information; it is a right to prevent disclosure.

42 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);
infra Part I.
43
See infra Section II.A.
44 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 206.
45 WESTIN, supra note 2, at 7.
46 Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1084; see infra Section II.B.
47 See infra Section II.C.
48 See infra Section II.D.
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It is easier to criticize than to construct. The challenge in this context is
to move from critique to an alternative: a clear definition of privacy that is
not similarly flawed. That definition, along with a robust defense of both its
terms and necessity, is this Article’s principal contribution. Picking up on
the unfinished efforts of an earlier generation of scholars like Westin and
Ruth Gavison, and adjusting where (I think) they went astray, this Article
proposes the following baseline definitions to anchor legal privacy
discourse. We can think of a right to privacy as the ability to prevent
disclosure of information about ourselves,49 and privacy as the absence of
information about us in the minds of others.50 These straightforward,
nontechnical definitions reflect a series of important and nuanced choices.
The definitions:
•
•
•
•
•
•

exclude sometimes-overlapping but distinct values such as
personal liberty;
distinguish between the right and the thing protected;
capture disclosures of all information that is identifiable to a
person, not just “sensitive” or “private” information;
maintain neutrality as to the desirability of any gain or loss of
privacy, leaving contested normative debates outside of the
definitions themselves;
capitalize on a broad understanding of the concept of
“disclosure”; and
avoid terms that add rather than dispel ambiguity, a common
misstep in modern privacy discourse.

Each of these choices is explained and defended in the pages that follow.
Importantly, this set of choices enables precise definition of a famously
elusive term. And that lays a foundation for the development of a robust
privacy theory that can inform difficult legal policy choices.
A concrete privacy definition can solidify the concept’s role in legal
discourse even as it diminishes the term’s rhetorical appeal. This is a
necessary tradeoff, at least for scholars. For when privacy means everything
it also means nothing. A concrete definition of a core privacy value that is
distinct from other values (i.e., “pure privacy”) is the only real rebuttal to the

49

See infra Section II.D.
See infra Section II.B. Consistent with my contention that debates about the strength of the privacy
interests should not be resolved in these definitions, I do not intend to signal anything about the strength
of any privacy entitlement by using the term “right” or “interest,” see INNESS, supra note 1, at 12, 13 n.9
(including similar caveat), although I do emphasize a distinction between a right and state of privacy,
contra HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 2–3 (2010) (noting disagreement about “whether
privacy is a claim, a right, an interest, a value, a preference, or merely a state of existence” and declining
to take a position).
50
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reductionists’ critique. But to get there, privacy scholars must usher some of
their prized residents out of the big tent: liberty, equality, anti-totalitarianism,
and, yes, “the right to be let alone.” These are important concerns. They
sometimes overlap with privacy. They are not privacy.51
It is important to stress that moving values out of the privacy tent does
not diminish those values. To the contrary, it brings them into focus. Privacy
proxy wars—policy fights that invoke the term privacy but are not really
about privacy at all—only obscure the interests at stake. By identifying the
distinct concerns driving any controversy, we can better weigh the tradeoffs
involved. The rhetoric may be less appealing, but the policies will improve.
At a minimum, precision ensures that when we argue, we are arguing about
the same things.
Having laid out an ambitious agenda, this Article proceeds in four Parts.
Part I provides a historical account of our failure to define privacy and offers
some hints at how to clear the haze surrounding the term. Part II builds on
the work of other scholars to construct a baseline definition of privacy for
use in legal discourse. By excluding distinct values and expanding on and
repairing flaws in the popular information-control conceptualization, this
definition offers precision to privacy debates. Part III responds to the
reductionists by demonstrating that the conception of privacy identified in
the proposed definition is a distinct value, not derivative of other rights. It
also builds out a theory of privacy by distinguishing the related concept of
“access,” and exploring a key aspect of the proposed definitions: the
multilayered meaning of “disclosure.” Finally, Part IV illustrates the value
of a definition by critiquing prominent debates that are, in fact, privacy proxy
wars: fights that center the term “privacy” but really concern other interests,
such as abuse of power and government oppression. The discussion shows
how precisely identifying the interests at stake can help clarify and refocus
difficult modern privacy debates.
I.

THE FAILURE TO DEFINE PRIVACY

This Part lays out the legal history of our inability to define privacy and
the unfortunate acquiescence to that failure. The discussion surfaces two
themes: (1) the early and ongoing mischaracterization of Warren and
Brandeis’s seminal article and (2) the Supreme Court’s repurposing of
Warren and Brandeis’s work to describe an important liberty interest that the
Justices did not want to call “liberty.” Philosopher Julie Inness
understandably criticizes those who contend that we confuse other interests

51
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with privacy on the ground that these critics “lack[] any explanation of the
birth of our ‘confusion.’”52 This Part offers that missing origin story.
The tale begins with an omission. The Declaration of Independence
proclaims that all people are endowed with “unalienable Rights,” including
“Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”53 The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution similarly protect “life,” “liberty,” and
“property.”54 But like the Declaration of Independence, “[t]he Constitution
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.”55
While other rights trace their lineage to these founding documents,
privacy is forced to look elsewhere. The drop-off is immense. “[T]he
foundation of privacy law in the United States” is Warren and Brandeis’s
1890 Harvard Law Review article, The Right to Privacy.56 The article
followed its authors’ lesser known collaborations, “‘The Watuppa Pond
Cases’ and ‘The Law of the Ponds,’ which drew upon their own experiences
in practice but left no enduring mark upon legal scholarship.”57
The Right to Privacy is an advocacy piece.58 Warren and Brandeis urged
courts to recognize a common law tort claim against the public disclosure of
private information. Most of the short article involves a single move. Warren
and Brandeis abstract a broad principle (the right “to be let alone”) from a
series of common law torts and argue that their proposed right enforced that

52 INNESS, supra note 1, at 66; see also Allen, supra note 28, at 359 (“[P]hilosophical theories should
not define privacy in a way that construed [the broad conception of privacy] as a mere confusion.”).
53 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
54 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
55 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
56 Solove, supra note 35, at 1099–1100; see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380 (1967)
(“celebrated article”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (“The
phrase ‘right to privacy’ appears first to have gained currency from an article written by Messrs. Warren
and (later Mr. Justice) Brandeis in 1890 . . . .”); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to
the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1732 (2010) (describing “celebrated
nineteenth-century law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis” as “the wellspring of
information privacy law”); Kenneth Einar Himma, Privacy Versus Security: Why Privacy Is Not an
Absolute Value or Right, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 858 (2007) (“Prior to the seminal argument
published by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis . . . there was no widely held belief that people
have a right to privacy—moral or otherwise.”); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for
Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 889, 923 (1992) (“a quasi-legendary article”); Frederick
Davis, What Do We Mean by “Right to Privacy”?, 4 S.D. L. REV. 1, 3 (1959) (“It is doubtful if any other
law review article, before or since, has achieved greater fame or recognition.”).
57 Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1343.
58 See Rubin, supra note 56, at 924 (critiquing the article as “strategic, not communicative” and thus
“represent[ing] a defect in legal scholarship”); Kalven, supra note 34, at 327–29 (“[T]he article reads so
much like a brief . . . .”); Clark C. Havighurst, Privacy: Foreword, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251,
251 (1966) (describing the article as “a lawyer’s catharsis rather than objective scholarship”); cf. Davis,
supra note 56, at 23 (contending that the article “is an illustration of how well-meaning but impatient
academicians can upset the normal development of the law by pushing it too hard”).
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same principle.59 A right to privacy, they wrote, “is merely an instance of the
enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone.”60
Using this logic, the authors assured courts that their proposal would not
amount to “judicial legislation,” because “the law has no new principle to
formulate when it extends this protection to the personal appearance,
sayings, acts, and to personal relations, domestic or otherwise.”61
Warren and Brandeis’s article became “one of the most famous and
influential law review articles ever written,”62 leading to a new cause of
action that barred “public disclosure of . . . private facts.”63 Unfortunately,
“the most famous law review article of all time”64 is also the most
misunderstood. The Right to Privacy is almost universally characterized as
the historic text where “Warren and Brandeis defined privacy as the ‘right to
be let alone.’”65 But Warren and Brandeis never claimed that the right to
59

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 205–13.
Id. at 205. They also describe the principle as “that of an inviolate personality,” using that phrase
to distance the source of their proposed right from “rights of property.” Id.
61 Id. at 213.
62 Charles E. Colman, About Ned, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 128, 128 (2016).
63 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 384–89 (1960) (describing influence of
Warren and Brandeis’s article); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946)
(quoting Dean Roscoe Pound, who called it “nothing less than . . . a chapter to our law”); Colman, supra
note 62, at 128 (“The Right to Privacy enjoys a reputation as one of the most famous and influential law
review articles ever written.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy,
45 BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 643 (2007) (describing it as “one of the most famous law review articles in
American history”); sources cited supra note 56.
64 See sources cited supra note 63.
65 Solove, supra note 35, at 1100. For a sampling of the long history of these misstatements, see
SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN 180 (2018) (“In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis had
described privacy as ‘the right to be let alone.’”); Jeffrey M. Skopek, Untangling Privacy: Losses Versus
Violations, 105 IOWA L. REV. 2169, 2178 (2020) (describing “the foundational claim of Warren and
Brandeis that the right of privacy is the right ‘to be let alone’”); Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy,
Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court
Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 951 (2009) (“The Right to Privacy . . . defined privacy as ‘the right to
be let alone . . . .’”); Adam Moore, Defining Privacy, 39 J. SOC. PHIL. 411, 412 (2008) (“Warren and
Brandeis . . . called it ‘the right to be let alone.’”); Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New
Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2163, 2176 (2003) (“Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis . . . conceived of
privacy as the right ‘to be let alone.’”); Gormley, supra note 57, at 1336 (“Warren and Brandeis
themselves defined it as a ‘right to be let alone.’”); Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s
Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 427 (1996) (“Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis colloquially defined privacy in 1890 as ‘the right to be let alone.’”); George
P. Long III, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1177, 1189–90
(1994) (“Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis broadly defined privacy as ‘the right to be let alone.’”);
ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 7 (1988) (describing
Warren and Brandeis’s “definition of ‘privacy’ as ‘being let alone’”); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for
a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 292 (1983)
(“Warren and Brandeis dubbed the protection they proposed a ‘right to privacy,’ and described it as the
60
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privacy was the right to be let alone. They situated their proposed privacy
right alongside other narrow rights, “like the right not to be assaulted or
beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously
prosecuted, the right not to be defamed.”66 A right to privacy, they argued,
was entitled to the same kinds of protections as these other specific rights,
all of which traced their ancestry to the “more general right of the individual
to be let alone.”67 In a largely unrecognized but momentous quirk of legal
history, much of the influence of Warren and Brandeis’s article stems from
later commentators’ failure to recognize this key nuance.68
Brandeis, of course, was just getting started. After narrowly escaping a
fate as the nation’s leading ponds scholar, “the people’s attorney”69 went on
to a seat on the Supreme Court.70 There, Justice Brandeis reprised his views
on privacy in a 1928 dissent in Olmstead v. United States.71 In language that
would prove broadly influential, he channeled the Framers’ purpose in
enacting the Bill of Rights: “They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred,
as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”72
Brandeis’s soaring rhetoric foreshadowed a jurisprudential revolution.
But his underlying theme remained consistent. Brandeis contended in
Olmstead, as he had in The Right to Privacy, that the right to be let alone was
an umbrella right (“the most comprehensive of rights”) from which other
rights, such as a privacy right against wiretapping, could be derived.73 Once

right ‘to be let alone.’”); Louis Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 693, 693 (1972) (“Warren and Brandeis identified privacy—which they defined . . . as the right ‘to
be let alone . . . .’”); William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 253, 254 (1966) (describing “Warren[] and Brandeis’s characterization of it as ‘the right to be let
alone’”); see also infra text accompanying notes 74–75, 82–86 (quoting Supreme Court Justices).
66 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 205.
67 Id.
68 Cf. Vernon Valentine Palmer, Three Milestones in the History of Privacy in the United States,
26 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 67, 78 (2011) (“[T]he inspiring effects that the suggestive phrase ‘the right to
be let alone’ had on the imaginations and intuitions of future interpreters cannot be discounted.”). In the
innumerable discussions of Warren and Brandeis’s seminal article, I found only one that makes this
critically important point but buries it in a footnote. See Gavison, supra note 26, at 437 n.48 (“Warren &
Brandeis . . . never equated the right to privacy with the right to be let alone; the article implied that the
right to privacy is a special case of the latter.”).
69 The Papers of Louis D. Brandeis, NAT’L HIST. PUBL’NS. & RECS. COMM’N.,
https://www.archives.gov/nhprc/projects/catalog/louis-brandeis [https://perma.cc/28QU-Y94C].
70 Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: Teacher, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 733, 738–42 (2007).
71 277 U.S. 438, 475–78 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 478 (emphasis added). Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent marked the first appearance of the “right
to be let alone” in a Supreme Court opinion.
73 Id.
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again, Brandeis abstracted an overarching principle (the right to be let alone)
from a series of more specific rights (those listed in the Bill of Rights) to
identify another specific right (privacy). And, again, the nuance was lost. In
1967, Justice Abe Fortas wrote a stirring dissent trumpeting this
misunderstanding: “As Mr. Justice Brandeis said in his famous dissent in
Olmstead v. United States, the right of privacy is ‘the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.’”74 The internal
quotation marks hint at the critical alteration. Brandeis argued that “the right
to be let alone” was the most comprehensive of rights. Fortas changed it to
“the right of privacy.” Other Justices would follow suit.75
For Justice Fortas and his colleagues, the jurisprudential challenge of
the era was how to address violations of civil liberties that were not covered
by specific textual guarantees in the Constitution. The Supreme Court’s
answer to this question began to crystalize in Griswold v. Connecticut in
1965.76 There, the majority ruled that “specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras” and the “[v]arious guarantees create zones of
privacy.”77 These zones doomed the Connecticut law at issue in that case,
which prohibited married couples’ access to contraception.78 The association
of marriage, the Supreme Court explained, involved “a right of privacy older
than the Bill of Rights.”79
The majority opinion in Griswold, authored by Justice William
Douglas, does not cite Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent or The Right to Privacy,
but its roots grow directly from those sources.80 In fact, Douglas’s law clerk

74

Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 413 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See infra notes 80–84 for examples from Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Stewart.
76 381 U.S. 479, 481–84 (1965); see Westin, supra note 2, at 353 (describing Griswold as “a major
first step toward enunciating a new constitutional doctrine of privacy”); Chemerinsky, supra note 63, at
647 (“The word ‘privacy’ was introduced into this area in Griswold v. Connecticut . . . .”); Louis Henkin,
Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1421 (1974) (stating, in reference to Griswold, that
“[a] constitutional ‘Right of Privacy,’ eo nomine and fundamental, was born in 1965’”).
77 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
78 Id. at 485–86.
79 Id. at 486; cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Of this whole
‘private realm of family life’ it is difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband
and wife’s marital relations.”). Douglas’s original draft anchored this line in a “right of association” rather
than a right of privacy. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 235
(1985) (“We deal with a right of association older than the Bill of Rights . . . .”).
80 The connection is easily traced through Douglas’s lectures, particularly one from 1958, titled “The
Right to Be Let Alone.” See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87–88 (1958) (published
lectures) (“There is, indeed, a congeries of . . . rights that may conveniently be called the right to be let
alone. They concern the right of privacy—sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit in the Constitution.
This right of privacy protects freedom of religion and freedom of conscience. It protects the privacy of
the home and the dignity of the individual . . . . It was described in comprehensive terms by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States.” (citation omitted)).
75
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suggested adding a reference to Brandeis’s 1928 dissent, but Douglas, known
for being inattentive to such details, “let the suggestion pass unheeded.”81
Douglas did, however, make the connection explicit in a later concurrence
in Doe v. Bolton, writing: “This right of privacy was called by Mr. Justice
Brandeis the right ‘to be let alone.’”82 Justice William Brennan, who had
pushed Douglas to adopt the “privacy” framing in Griswold,83 picked up the
baton in a subsequent contraception case, Eisenstadt v. Baird.84 There,
Brennan, like Fortas and Douglas, treated “the right of privacy” as a
jurisprudential twin of the right to be let alone. Citing Brandeis’s Olmstead
dissent, Brennan wrote: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”85 The Supreme Court went on
to apply this reasoning in a variety of contexts, developing a line of “‘right
of privacy’ cases” that restricted state interference in “matters relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
and education.”86
A puzzling aspect of this legal framing is why the Court used “privacy”
when another label, “liberty,” seems better suited. As historian Sarah Igo
explains, “The Court’s historic ruling [in Griswold] raising privacy to the
status of a constitutional right resolved an issue that almost no one at the time
associated closely with privacy.”87 The obvious word choice here was
“liberty.” As philosopher W.A. Parent explains: “The commonly accepted
and philosophically justified conception of liberty is precisely the absence of

81 DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 252 (1994). Many of Douglas’s opinions were
“drafted in twenty minutes” with some “written on the bench during oral argument.” Id. at 245.
82 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
83 See Laurence H. Tribe, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 1, 45 (1997)
(describing “Brennan’s pivotal role in Griswold” but noting that, since Douglas only partially followed
Brennan’s guidance, the “opinion was unsatisfyingly sketchy” and it “was left to Justice Brennan to bring
the analysis to full gestation in his opinion for the Court in Eisenstadt”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 79, at
237–39 (summarizing Brennan’s influence).
84 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
85 Id. This sentence had obvious implications for the then-pending Roe v. Wade case, something
Brennan and his clerks recognized in writing the Eisenstadt opinion. GARROW, supra note 81, at 542.
86 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976); Chemerinsky, supra note 63, at 651 (collecting cases
where “[p]rivacy as autonomy has been safeguarded in decisions upholding rights such as the right to
marry, the right to procreate, the right to custody of one’s children, the right to keep the family together,
the right to control the upbringing of children, the right to purchase and use contraceptives, the right to
engage in private consensual homosexual activity, and the right to refuse medical treatment” (citations
omitted)).
87 IGO, supra note 65, at 158; cf. SCHWARTZ, supra note 79, at 227 (“Before Griswold the right of
privacy was essentially a right only between private individuals, with a tort action available to those
aggrieved by violations of that right.”).
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external constraints. Laws that effectively prevent citizens from pursuing
various activities infringe (sometimes justifiably, sometimes not) on
personal liberty. The laws in Griswold [and subsequent cases] all infringed
liberty . . . .”88 The “right to be let alone,” as Warren and Brandeis used the
phrase, and as used in later Supreme Court opinions, expresses a conception
of liberty, not privacy. And liberty, unlike privacy, is explicitly protected by
the Constitution.89
So why didn’t the Justices use “personal liberty” to describe a right
against unwarranted government interference in peoples’ lives? Because an
earlier set of Justices poisoned the phrase. As one critic writing in 1975
framed the problem: “Terrified by history to talk openly in terms of
substantive liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Justices
talked instead in fragile and convoluted reasoning of privacy rights swirling
around in ectoplasmic emanations.”90
The history that terrified the Justices dated to the 1905 case of Lochner
v. New York.91 In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated a state law that
limited bakery-employee hours because the law violated “the right of the
individual to his personal liberty.”92 The Court followed Lochner with a
series of rulings striking down progressive business regulations and raising
the ire of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition.93 The Court publicly
retreated from Lochner in 1937—the same year that President Roosevelt
proposed court-packing legislation.94 Lochner became synonymous with bad
politics and bad judging, an object lesson in “how courts should not decide
constitutional cases.”95 By the time Griswold was decided, judges and
scholars across the ideological spectrum repudiated the case.96

88 W.A. Parent, A New Definition of Privacy for the Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 305, 316 (1983); see also
Thomson, supra note 27, at 312 (arguing that “making a kind of conduct illegal is infringing on a liberty”
as opposed to privacy interest).
89 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
90 GRAHAM HUGHES, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURTS 72 (1975).
91 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
92 Id. at 56.
93 See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 227–36 (1994)
(chronicling the disputed relationship between the Court’s doctrinal evolution and the prospect of courtpacking).
94 Id.
95 Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism,
85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 678, 689 (2005) (chronicling history).
96 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“The doctrine that prevailed in
Lochner . . . and like cases . . . has long since been discarded.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (noting that the “received wisdom is that Lochner was wrong” and
“an illegitimate intrusion by the courts”).
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The “ghost of Lochner”97 haunted the constitutional right to privacy
cases.98 Estelle Griswold’s brief states, “We are not, in short, asking here for
reinstatement of the line of due process decisions exemplified by Lochner
vs. New York.”99 The majority opinions in both Griswold100 and Roe v.
Wade101 explicitly disclaim reliance on Lochner, over protests of the dissents
on that point.102 Justice Douglas, the author of Griswold’s majority opinion,
was acutely conscious of the “ghost of Lochner.” He had coined that nowfamous phrase in a 1958 opinion to reject a constitutional challenge to
restrictive federal housing regulations.103 And Douglas insisted in his lectures
that “[t]he natural rights of which I speak are different” from the “[n]atural
rights . . . invoked by the laissez-faire theorists” responsible for Lochner.104
In private correspondence, Justice Brennan invoked this concern to convince
Douglas to revise his first draft of the Griswold opinion, cautioning that the
loosely styled constitutional right to association Douglas initially relied on
“may come back to haunt us just as Lochner did.”105
One way to sidestep the ghost of Lochner (and a resurgence of Lochnerlike cases) was to identify “privacy,” not “liberty,” as the touchstone of the
new jurisprudence.106 The only problem—that privacy did not have the same
97

Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 92 (1958).
See Stephen M. Feldman, Unenumerated Rights in Different Democratic Regimes, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 47, 99 (2006) (“As was true of Douglas, the other Justices wrote their opinions in the shadow
of Lochner.”).
99 Brief for Appellants at 23, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496).
100 381 U.S. at 481–82 (“Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York . . . should
be our guide. But we decline that invitation . . . .”).
101 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (endorsing “Justice Holmes’ . . . now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v.
New York”).
102 See id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“While the Court’s opinion quotes from the dissent of
Mr. Justice Holmes in Lochner . . . the result it reaches is more closely attuned to the majority opinion.”);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority “would reinstate the
Lochner . . . line of cases”); see also William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent
with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1974) (arguing that “the two lines
of cases are ‘sisters under the skin’”); Balkin, supra note 95, at 683 (explaining that the “task of the
constitutional scholar” of the era was to explain “why you could love Roe and still hate Lochner”).
103 Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91–92 (1958) (“Invocation of the Due
Process Clause to protect the rights asserted here would make the ghost of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
34, walk again.”); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (Douglas, J.) (“The day
is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out
of harmony with a particular school of thought.”).
104 DOUGLAS, supra note 80, at 89.
105 GARROW, supra note 81, at 246–47 (quoting Brennan’s letter to Douglas).
106 See Gavison, supra note 26, at 466 (“Privacy . . . has been used to avoid such historically loaded
legal terms as ‘substantive due process’ and ‘liberty.’”); Westin, supra note 2, at 350–51 (emphasizing
98
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meaning as liberty—could be elided in a variety of ways. Douglas followed
the path sketched in his and others’ writings: equating a right of privacy with
a close cousin of liberty, Brandeis’s right to be let alone.107 Douglas had been
pushing to conflate liberty with privacy for years. This desire was most
transparently expressed in an obscure dissent in a 1952 case. In Public
Utilities Commission v. Pollak, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional
challenge to the District of Columbia’s practice of playing radio programs to
“captive audiences” on public streetcars.108 Douglas disagreed with the
ruling, arguing, among other things, that “the meaning of ‘liberty’ as used in
the Fifth Amendment . . . must mean more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well.”109 Douglas had long
sought to marry liberty and privacy. In Griswold, the Court finally accepted
this proposal.
This history illuminates the question that started this Part: How did we
end up with such a cluttered understanding of “privacy”? The answer, as
summarized above, is that the term was collateral damage in the Court’s
struggle to exorcise the ghost of Lochner. Warren and Brandeis invited
confusion by insisting that the common law already protected a right to
privacy through an amorphous “right to be let alone.” Later, scholars and
Supreme Court Justices mischaracterized Warren and Brandeis’s claim to
suggest an illogical equivalence between the right to be let alone and a right
to privacy. For historical reasons, this “right to privacy, in its constitutional
incarnation,”110 became an expedient legal anchor for the most famous line
of cases in American jurisprudence. Privacy scholars, open to expanding
their budding field and perhaps leery of slighting the popular new
constitutional rights, welcomed the lot into an expanding privacy tent.
II. A NEW DEFINITION OF AN OLD CONCEPT
The history summarized in Part I identifies the crux of the definitional
dilemma. Without some decluttering, those seeking to conceptualize privacy
must include all of the following under a privacy banner:
the constraints placed on the Supreme Court in this era by “the philosophical and institutional realities of
the American judicial process”); Henkin, supra note 76, at 1421 (“The majority, per Justice Douglas,
expressed its determination not to find it in undifferentiated ‘liberty’ subject to substantive due process.”).
107 See supra note 80 and accompanying text; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); cf. William N. Eskridge Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2237–38 (2002) (quoting a 1919
brief, which states: “Personal ‘liberty’ includes not only freedom from physical restraint, but also the
right ‘to be let alone,’ to determine one’s mode of life”).
108 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952).
109 Id. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
110 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 802 (1989).
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protecting personal information (Warren and Brandeis);
the “right to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis
misunderstood); and
an expansive catalogue of constitutional “privacy” cases.

No definition can span these categories. Consequently, all the movement is
in the wrong direction. In the absence of definitional boundaries, other
interests flow freely into the privacy tent, including dignity,111 liberty,
equality, autonomy, self-determination,112 entitlements to be free of
nuisance,113 and, ultimately, the ability to access all the ingredients necessary
to “human flourishing.”114 A definition is the only way out. And the only way
to get to a definition is to first untangle liberty and privacy.
A. Distinguishing Privacy from Liberty
To the extent judges and scholars recognize the awkward fusion of
privacy with nonprivacy interests, they try to bracket the problem by dividing
privacy into two major subfields: “decisional privacy” and “information
privacy.”115 Although not precisely delineated, the former contains the
constitutional privacy cases and the latter captures Westin’s notion of

111

See discussion in infra note 202.
Schneider, supra note 21, at 975 (arguing that privacy “encompasses liberty, equality, freedom
of bodily integrity, autonomy, and self-determination”).
113 See Rowan v. U.S. Post Off. Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (upholding a law that allowed
people to opt out of certain mail “to protect privacy”); Christina E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests,
87 N.C. L. REV. 151, 177 (2008) (describing how “[s]tatutes regulating peaceful funeral protests purport
to embrace a privacy interest that protects against unwanted intrusions”); Mark S. Nadel, Rings of
Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4 YALE J. ON REGUL. 99, 101 (1986)
(“The constitutional right of privacy supports regulation protecting individuals against undesired
unsolicited phone calls.”).
114 Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 651 (2015) (citing
Cohen, supra note 3, at 1911); see also supra Introduction (describing a wide array of “privacy” interests).
115 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977) (noting “at least two different kinds of
interests” in the Court’s privacy cases: “One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”);
Babette Boliek, Prioritizing Privacy in the Courts and Beyond, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1112 (2018)
(explaining that “[i]nformational privacy is not the same as decisional privacy”); Scott SkinnerThompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 171 (2015) (explaining, “scholars have attempted
to draw a proximate relationship between informational privacy and . . . decisional privacy”); Richards,
supra note 1, at 1089 (“[I]nformation privacy scholars have tended to base their work either expressly or
implicitly upon a binary distinction between ‘decisional privacy’ and ‘information privacy.’”); Paul M.
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2058 (2004) (“Information
privacy can, therefore, be distinguished from ‘decisional privacy.’”); cf. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space
Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 146 (2011) (discussing prospect of “a constitutional right to information
privacy”).
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controlling information.116 But this move, even when explicitly
acknowledged, generates rather than eliminates incoherence.
The decisional privacy category—drawn from loose phrasings in
Supreme Court opinions117—is itself a conceptual minefield. The biggest
flaw is its descriptive bankruptcy, with both words in the phrase serving as
opaque placeholders for the more fitting terms: “personal” and “liberty.”118
“Decision” is the wrong word in this context because it shifts the focus
away from the government prohibition at issue. The laws struck down in the
constitutional decisional privacy cases prohibited acts, not decisions. In
Griswold, Connecticut prohibited the distribution of contraception.119 In Roe,
Texas prohibited abortion.120 It is true that any legal prohibition can be
recharacterized as an infringement upon a decision to do the forbidden thing.
But we don’t normally characterize things this way. I wouldn’t say, “The
store is closed; therefore I cannot decide to enter the store.” This exercise
becomes farcical when applied in analogous legal contexts. When the
District of Columbia prohibited handguns, it did not deprive its residents of
their “decisional right to keep and bear arms.”121 Similarly, banning a book
does not violate the author’s “decisional free speech rights.” Decisions are
an odd place to look when assessing government prohibitions. Without some
compelling justification (and none is apparent), there is little reason for
scholars to focus on decisions in this context, as opposed to the direct
infringement on liberty that arises when the government prohibits a specific
act.122
The term “privacy” in decisional privacy introduces further
imprecision. Confusion arises immediately since privacy is being used
differently than in the phrase’s partner, informational privacy. In
informational privacy, “privacy” typically concerns the disclosure and

116

See sources cited supra note 115.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that “the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision”); Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (discussing
“the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation”).
118 Cf. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419 (1983) (“[T]he right of
privacy . . . [is] grounded in the concept of personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.”).
119 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (Connecticut statute: “Any person who
uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined . . .
or imprisoned . . . .”).
120 See 410 U.S. at 117 n.1 (Texas statute: “If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant
woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine . . . and thereby
procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary . . . .”).
121 See District of Columbia. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
122 Outside a scholarly context, legal advocates might seek to focus on the decision rather than the
act to increase popular support in circumstances where the act is unpopular.
117

482

116:463 (2021)

Pure Privacy

dissemination of information.123 But in the decisional privacy cases, the state
is not forcing people to disclose any decisions. If anything, the prohibitions
that implicate decisional privacy push forbidden decisions out of view.
The problem is that, despite its appearance in noun form, the term
“privacy” in the phrase decisional privacy is not being used in a nounal sense
at all. “Privacy” serves in this context to evoke “private,” the adjective, and
thus a public–private dichotomy.124 The term emphasizes an individual’s
increased liberty to make personal choices, i.e., choices that uniquely impact
the individual as opposed to the public.125 As the Supreme Court’s own
opinions make clear, the Court recognizes decisional privacy rights only “in
the context of certain personal decisions.”126
Thus, both terms, “decisional” and “privacy,” fail in their descriptive
efforts while “personal” and “liberty” fit perfectly. So why use decisional
privacy instead of “personal liberty” in this context? One explanation is that
it maintains the fiction that decisional privacy and information privacy are
related when, in fact, they have little direct connection at all.127
But descriptive bankruptcy isn’t the only problem with the decisional
privacy label. Since decisional privacy is an expansive, ambiguous category
with only coincidental overlap with informational privacy, its inclusion in
the privacy tent opens broad spaces for other privacy-adjacent interests. If
privacy includes personal liberty interests like “the right . . . to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion,”128 it is easily stretched to include
freedom from analogous intrusions, such as the colleague who sits too close,
the neighbor who plays loud music, and marketers who flood us with
123

Solove, supra note 5, at 489.
See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (“Our
cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of
individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government.”); Whisenhunt v. Spradlin,
464 U.S. 965, 971 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“Without identifying the
precise contours of this right, we have recognized that it includes a broad range of private choices
involving family life and personal autonomy.”). There are occasional elements of privacy (as defined
here) mixed into the prohibitions, but these fall neatly into the other half of the dichotomy, informational
privacy.
125 See sources cited supra note 124; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 216 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“‘[L]iberty,’ if it
means anything, must entail freedom from governmental domination in making the most intimate and
personal of decisions.”).
126 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980).
127 Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2009–10 (2010)
(“[T]he stark differences in the respective analytical frameworks, stakes, historical pedigrees, and
distributive contexts dwarf the extant similarities between informational and decisional privacy.”).
128 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
124
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unwanted calls, texts, and advertisements. It is a small and popular step from
decisional privacy to a boundaryless conception. Privacy becomes an interest
in being free from any disfavored influence, spanning everything from a slap
in the face to that annoying sound people make when they chew.129
It is no affront to any of the constitutionally protected “privacy” rights
to recognize that the road forward requires scholars to make an important
choice. Privacy is either a rigorous concept susceptible to definition or it is a
rhetorical label that we attach to things we like. I would choose the former.
But after decades of cloudy legal discourse, it seems clear that explicit
recognition of either alternative would be preferable to the straddling of both
options represented by the status quo.
It may be important at this point to emphasize that any superficial
resemblance of the arguments above to conservative critiques of the
legitimacy of substantive due process case law is illusory. Distilling liberty
out of “privacy” should not be viewed as a repudiation of the decisional
privacy cases. It is just getting ahead of the curve. As the ghost of Lochner
fades into history and constitutional text becomes an increasingly important
interpretive currency,130 the Supreme Court’s reliance on the term “privacy”
will continue to ebb. The Justices were always ambivalent about their
embrace of the term.131 True, Robert Bork imploded his Supreme Court
prospects by scolding the Senators at his confirmation hearings that a general
right to privacy was nowhere to be found in the Constitution.132 But his
replacement, Anthony Kennedy, found the sweet spot by noting that, even if
Bork was right, Americans’ cherished decisional privacy rights were
protected by the term “liberty, which is . . . in the Constitution.”133 As
Kennedy understood, Bork didn’t stand outside the mainstream because he
thought “privacy” was the wrong word. He stood outside the mainstream
because he didn’t think “liberty” worked either.134 Kennedy’s insight led to
his unanimous confirmation (in Bork’s place) to the Supreme Court, where
Justice Kennedy became a reliable vote for unenumerated substantive due
129 See James Cartreine, Misophonia: When Sounds Really Do Make You “Crazy,” HARV. HEALTH
BLOG (June 24, 2019), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/misophonia-sounds-really-make-crazy2017042111534 [https://perma.cc/V7ZR-59Q5].
130 See Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV. 233, 238 n.24 (2019)
(describing textualism as “the dominant mode of modern constitutional interpretation”).
131 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
132 GARROW, supra note 81, at 671–72 (recounting history); Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to
Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 740 (2010) (noting “Bork’s rejection of the right to privacy is widely
viewed as having doomed his nomination”).
133 GARROW, supra note 81, at 672 (quoting Kennedy’s response to Senator Biden at his hearings:
“It is not clear to me that substituting the word ‘privacy’ is much of an advance over interpreting the word
‘liberty,’ which is already in the Constitution”).
134 Id. at 671–72 (chronicling confirmation hearings).
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process rights. As this history demonstrates, recognizing that privacy isn’t a
synonym for liberty doesn’t make you Bork. It makes you Kennedy,
Marshall,135 Stevens,136 Nussbaum,137 and Greene.138 Calling liberty “liberty”
rather than “privacy” doesn’t devalue so-called decisional privacy rights. It
tightens the connection between those rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
text, enhancing rather than undermining the legitimacy of the Court’s
substantive due process cases.139
Largely thanks to a series of Kennedy opinions, the semantic
groundwork for a substitution of “personal liberty” for constitutional
decisional privacy already exists, most obviously in the marriage cases.140 A
century ago, the Supreme Court placed the “right to marry” under the
heading “liberty,” only to swap labels fifty years later, proclaiming that “the
right to marry is part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy.’”141 In 2015 in
Obergefell v. Hodges, Kennedy’s opinion for the Court returned to liberty,
emphasizing the “abiding connection between marriage and liberty.”142 The
Obergefell majority uses the word “liberty” twenty-five times, twice in the
135

After the first argument in Roe v. Wade, Justice Marshall summed up this sentiment at the
Justices’ conference, stating that he thought the Court should ground its decision in liberty, since “‘liberty’
covers about any right to have things done to your body.” Id. at 530.
136 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndividual
decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship . . . are a form of
‘liberty.’”).
137 See Martha C. Nussbaum, What’s Privacy Got to Do with It?, in WOMEN AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 153, 163 (Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach & Patricia Smith eds., 2003) (“What is at
stake in contraception and abortion is decisional autonomy or liberty.”). Justice Stewart, too. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The Constitution nowhere mentions a specific
right of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life, but the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due
Process Clause . . . covers more than those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights.”).
138 See Greene, supra note 132, at 746–47 (arguing that the constitutional right to privacy has “bad
optics” and that “liberty” would be a preferable replacement).
139 See id. at 743 (“‘Liberty’ is hardly self-defining, but it can boast three appearances in the
Constitution, including in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments –– that is of course three more
appearances than ‘privacy.’”).
140 See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002–
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 33 (2003) (stressing that “[l]iberty, not privacy, pervades” Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Lawrence). Jamal Greene credits Justice Stevens for the Court’s evolution from
“privacy” to “liberty,” arguing that “Justice Kennedy appeared to adopt Justice Stevens’s view” in
Lawrence. Greene, supra note 132, at 718, 736.
141 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(“While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term . . .
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to marry . . . .”).
142 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty
protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.”);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) (emphasizing “the reasoning in Roe
relating to the woman’s liberty”); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 772 (1986) (“Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain
private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government.”).
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first sentence: “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a
liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful
realm, to define and express their identity.”143 Following the old playbook,
the dissent drags out the ghost of Lochner.144 The Obergefell majority hardly
blinks. The majority never responds to the Lochner charge and mentions
“privacy” only once (in a quote). The Court is already well on its way to
ushering the constitutional privacy-qua-liberty cases back into a pure liberty
home.145 Scholarly acknowledgement of the distinction between privacy and
liberty can parallel and encourage this salutary development.
Stripping away liberty and various other permutations of the right “to
be let alone” makes defining privacy possible. Solove’s fourfold privacy
taxonomy illustrates this point. The taxonomy consists of the following:
•
•
•
•

“information collection”;
“information processing”;
“information dissemination”; and
“invasion.”146

To borrow a line from Sesame Street, one of these things is not like the
others.147 The last category—which Solove defines as “direct interferences
with the individual, such as intruding into her life or regulating the kinds of
decisions she can make about her life”148—is the right to be let alone. It is
liberty, not privacy. Removing the fourth category leaves three categories
that center around the disclosure and dissemination of information. This is a
necessary first step on the path to a definition.
B. The Information that Matters
The Supreme Court’s repurposing of the term privacy came at an
inopportune time. Just as the Court was commandeering “privacy” to protect
a type of personal liberty, scholars were beginning to work out a concrete
definition of the term. In an influential book published in 1967, Alan Westin

143

135 S. Ct. at 2593.
Id. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“In the decades after Lochner, the Court struck down nearly
200 laws as violations of individual liberty . . . .”).
145 Cf. William N. Eskridge Jr., Latter-Day Constitutionalism: Sexuality, Gender, and Mormons,
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1227, 1281 (describing “due process ‘liberty’” as “the new and broader home for
privacy doctrine”); David Garrow, Privacy and the American Constitution, 68 SOC. RSCH. 55, 55–56
(2001) (describing the shift from privacy to liberty).
146 Solove, supra note 3, at 489.
147 Sesame Street, One of These Things, YOUTUBE (June 7, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rsRjQDrDnY8 [https://perma.cc/K5FL-HPG6].
148 Solove, supra note 6, at 759; Solove, supra note 3, at 491 (“invasions into people’s private
affairs”).
144
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offered the following definition: “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups,
or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others.”149 A year later, Charles
Fried wrote: “Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the
minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information about
ourselves.”150 He added: “Privacy, thus, is control over knowledge about
oneself.”151
Westin’s notion of privacy as control over information appears in a
variety of sources, including a brief cameo in a Supreme Court opinion;152 it
is “perhaps the most widely cited definition of privacy among scholars.”153
In an alternative universe where the Court stuck with “liberty” rather than
“privacy” to limit government restrictions on people’s activities, debates
centered on Westin’s definition would likely have led to a broadly accepted
legal conception of privacy.
Privacy as control over personal information is the next logical step
after Warren and Brandeis. But Westin’s definition has significant flaws,
some widely recognized, and others hardly noticed. Even when these flaws
are addressed, the information-control conception requires refinement and
explication. The balance of this Part takes up that task.
We begin with some of the most common criticisms. Dan Solove takes
special aim at the conception of privacy as the control of personal
information in arguing for his taxonomy. Echoing criticism by Parent and

149 WESTIN, supra note 2, at 7. On Westin’s influence, see Lisa M. Austin, Re-Reading Westin,
20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53, 54 (2019) (describing Westin’s work as “foundational to the field of
privacy”); Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Measuring Privacy: An Empirical Test Using Context
to Expose Confounding Variables, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 176, 186 (2016) (“Alan Westin’s
vast contribution to privacy in research and public policy cannot be overstated.”); Parent, supra note 88,
at 326 (stating that “Alan Westin is perhaps its best known advocate” in reference to information control
theory of privacy); Chemerinsky, supra note 63, at 649 (describing Westin’s as a “seminal book on the
right to privacy”).
150 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
151 Id. at 483; see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. L.J. 2117, 2120
(2001) (“By privacy, then, I mean the ability to exercise control over personal information.”).
152 U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (“[P]rivacy
encompass[es] the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.”).
153 Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1083; Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity,
101 VA. L. REV. 691, 701 (2015) (recognizing “the widely advanced idea that privacy is a form of
informational control”); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820–
21 (2000) (describing the “weight of the consensus about the centrality of privacy-control” as
“staggering” and including “the scholarship of Charles Fried, Richard Posner, Frederick Schauer, Alan
Westin, and others”).
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others,154 Solove argues that “conceptualizing privacy as control over
personal information can be too vague, too broad, or too narrow.”155
Solove contends that an information-control theory of privacy is “too
narrow,” because “it excludes those aspects of privacy that are not
informational, such as the right to make certain fundamental decisions about
one’s body, reproduction, or rearing of one’s children.”156 We have already
addressed this objection. These are important concepts, but they concern
liberty, not privacy. These liberty concepts (aka decisional privacy)
destabilize modern efforts to conceptualize privacy only through a historical
accident: the mischaracterization of Warren and Brandeis’s 1890 article and
the Supreme Court’s subsequent leveraging of that misunderstanding to
exorcise the ghost of Lochner.
Solove’s remaining critiques concern one parameter of an informationcontrol definition—and the subject of this Section. Solove argues that
attempts to use information control to define privacy are either “too vague”
because proponents of the theory often “fail to define the types of
information over which individuals should have control” or “too broad
because there is a significant amount of information identifiable to us that
we do not deem as private.”157
Solove is correct that any definition of privacy that centers on the
disclosure of information must identify the information that counts. The most
common approach is to carve out a category of intimate or sensitive
information. Judicial discussions of statutory privacy rights take this
approach, restricting legal protections to disclosures of “personal matters,”158
such as “sexual relationships” or “medical records.”159 Scholarly treatments
take on the more difficult task of attempting to precisely describe these
boundaries. In one of the more prominent efforts, W.A. Parent argues:
[P]ersonal information consists of facts that most persons in a given society
choose not to reveal about themselves (except to close friends, family, . . .) or
of facts about which a particular individual is acutely sensitive and therefore

154

Parent, supra note 88, at 326–27; Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1114 (critiquing information control
as “a conception with some serious shortcomings”).
155 Solove, supra note 35, at 1115.
156 Id. at 1110; ALLEN, supra note 65, at 8 (critiquing Westin’s definition as incomplete on similar
grounds).
157 Solove, supra note 35, at 1111–12, 1115.
158 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458–59
(1977) (emphasizing that claim in Whalen applied to “private medical information” while Nixon’s
materials did not include “purely private papers and recordings”).
159 Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994) (limiting the right to
“sensitive and confidential information”); John B. v. Super. Ct., 137 P.3d 153, 166–67 (Cal. 2006) (noting
application to “sexual relations” and “medical records”).
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does not choose to reveal about himself—even though most persons don’t care
if these same facts about themselves are widely known.160

Julie Inness draws a line at “intimate” matters, which she defines as “matters
that draw their meaning and value from the agent’s love, liking, and care.”161
These examples illustrate one of the common perils for a privacy
definition. A definition should clarify the defined term, not introduce
additional uncertainty. Definitions like those offered by Parent and Inness
generate more questions than answers. How do we determine which facts
“most persons in a given society choose not to reveal” or “draw their
meaning from . . . care”? What counts as “acutely sensitive” as opposed to
just “sensitive”? Why not include other facts identifiable to an individual,
such as a person’s purchases or location, that are usually not sensitive but,
especially in the aggregate, implicate privacy?162
The most important point to make about these line-drawing efforts,
however, is that they are unnecessary. We need not decide what facts people
desire or should desire to keep to themselves. A definition of privacy can
apply to all facts about a person. For this, we can borrow just two words from
Parent’s lengthy definition (“about themselves”). Although speaking more
colloquially on this point, Fried identifies the information of concern as
“information about us,” “information about ourselves,” or “knowledge about
oneself.”163 Westin uses “information about them,” referring to “individuals,
groups, or institutions.”164
Broad conceptions of the information that matters for a privacy
definition recognize that any disclosure of information identifiable to an
individual implicates privacy. For example, my height and eye color are not
generally concealed or sensitive or intimate facts. But that does not mean we
should exclude these types of facts from a definition of privacy. Some people
do conceal these facts.165 Their efforts sound squarely in privacy. But even if
160 Parent, supra note 88, at 307; see also Rosen, supra note 151, at 2120 (“[B]y personal
information, I mean information over which I reasonably expect to exercise control.”).
161 INNESS, supra note 1, at 140 ; cf. Skinner-Thompson, supra note 115, at 205 (seeking heightened
constitutional protection for “intimate information”); Cohen, supra note 3, at 1911 (“Lack of privacy
means reduced scope of self-making.”).
162 See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution,
86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1185 (2002) (emphasizing the “aggregation problem”).
163 Fried, supra note 150, at 482–83.
164
WESTIN, supra note 2, at 7.
165 See, e.g., Tim Molloy, James Gunn Would Like Actors to Please Stop Lying About Their Height,
MOVIEMAKER (June 17, 2021), https://www.moviemaker.com/james-gunn-would-like-actors-to-pleasestop-lying-about-their-height/ [https://perma.cc/WXD6-D2MR] (reporting director James Gunn’s
estimate that “easily 50% of the time male actors exaggerate how tall they are, sometimes by a lot, on

489

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

no one can avoid disclosure of certain information, that means only that, in
this society at this moment, we lack certain aspects of privacy. This is
especially true in an era when seemingly mundane bits of data, such as our
location at any given moment, can be strung together to draw conclusions
about our habits and preferences. Definitions of privacy that only capture
“intimate” or “sensitive” information miss this critical point⎯an omission
made especially salient with the arrival of “Big Data.”166
Limits on the types of information captured by a privacy definition
appear to stem from a desire to characterize privacy as a positive normative
good.167 Many scholars assume that privacy is good and therefore losses of
privacy must be bad. This leads to efforts to build these normative
conclusions into the definition of privacy. Nonintimate or widely known
facts, such as the color of your car,168 your status as a politician,169 or a
newsworthy arrest,170 must be excluded from the definition because these
facts can be justifiably disclosed and transmitted. The revelation of that kind
of information is not bad, the argument goes, so that kind of information
should not be captured in a definition of privacy. The instinct is
understandable but misguided and, as described above, ultimately dooms the
effort. The alternative is to craft a neutral definition of privacy.171
Neutrally defined, privacy is not an ideal we must maximize, like justice
or health. It is not necessarily a positive thing at all. It is like temperature.
The desirable setting depends on the individual and the context. For example,
four hundred degrees is too hot, except if you are making pizza. Importantly,
their resumes”); Amanda Barrell, Eye Color Percentages Around the World, MED. NEWS TODAY (Nov.
25, 2020), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/eye-color-percentage [https://perma.cc/4ZGNW67T] (“For cosmetic reasons, some people choose to wear colored contact lenses to change the color
of their eyes.”).
166 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1205–
06 (1998).
167 See Skopek, supra note 153, at 699 (“Normative conceptions of privacy, which dominate the
privacy scholarship, define privacy in terms that incorporate into its meaning the idea that privacy is a
good thing that deserves moral and legal protection.”); Solove, supra note 35, at 1145 (“According to
many theorists, privacy has . . . an inherently positive value.”); INNESS, supra note 1, at 45–47, 59
(criticizing conceptions of privacy characterized by “value neutrality” and arguing that privacy is a
“positively valued condition”); REGAN, supra note 1, at 221 (“Most privacy scholars emphasize that the
individual is better off if privacy exists; I argue that society is better off as well when privacy exists.”).
168 INNESS, supra note 1, at 58 & 71 n.13 (“where I park my car,” “my car’s color, the nature of my
job, or the timber of my voice”).
169 Solove, supra note 35, at 1111–12 (contending that the fact that “a person is a well-known
politician is identifiable to her but is not private”); cf. Green, supra note 2, at 256 (arguing for a more
nuanced take on candidate privacy).
170 Parent, supra note 88, at 308 (offering this example as “belonging to the public record”).
171 I use the term “neutral” here to mean that the definition does not prejudge the normative goodness
or badness of any privacy loss. The term is not meant to connote the absence of a choice in adopting this
definition or to deny that, like any meaningful choice, this choice has downstream effects.
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adopting a neutral definition of privacy does not commit scholars to
remaining neutral as to the benefits of protecting privacy rights—so long as
those rights are precisely defined. This precision (Section II.D), along with
a key distinction between the right and the thing protected (Section II.C), is
discussed in later Sections.
For now, the critical point is that we need not build any predetermined
“good” amount or type of privacy into a privacy definition. All we need to
agree on at the outset is that when facts about a person are disclosed, that
person’s privacy decreases. This may be good or bad, but we can more
candidly argue about these normative questions if they are not smuggled into
the privacy definition.172 Normative assumptions can be transparently
surfaced in decisions about the protections afforded to a right to privacy and
the degree to which the right can be overridden by other interests.
Even with a neutral approach to defining privacy, a line must be drawn.
Not all disclosures implicate privacy. Only information about yourself
counts. As already emphasized, the category is intended to be inclusive. It
includes information about one’s body, activities, spaces, knowledge,
feelings, and thoughts. As Jerry Kang explains, a broad understanding is
especially important with respect to digital information. Kang emphasizes
that “personal” in this context should “not mean especially sensitive, private,
or embarrassing. Rather, it describes a relationship between the information
and a person, namely that the information⎯whether sensitive or trivial⎯is
somehow identifiable to an individual.”173
Many facts in public discourse are not identifiable to an individual. This
is true even if the information concerns individuals. For example, if a news
site publishes an estimate of the prevalence of chickenpox in the population,
that revelation does not implicate privacy. Privacy is still not implicated even
if the publication includes common symptoms, treatments, and outcomes. It
is true that when I later learn that someone has chickenpox, the publication
gives me a sense of what that means. Privacy is ultimately implicated in this
indirect way, but the focus of “privacy” is a connection to an identifiable
individual. Thus, if the site publishes a list of the names of individuals with
chickenpox, there is a clear reduction of privacy.
172 Ruth Gavison similarly argues for a “neutral” definition of privacy “that does not make
desirability . . . part of the notion of privacy,” while accepting that “[w]hen we claim legal protection for
privacy, we mean that only those aspects should be protected, and we no longer refer to the ‘neutral’
concept of privacy.” Gavison, supra note 26, at 425; see also ALLEN, supra note 65, at 3 (identifying
privacy as a “neutral concept denoting conditions that are neither always desirable . . . nor always
undesirable”).
173 Kang, supra note 166, at 1206–07; see also Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, 2016 O.J.
(L 119) 33 (EU) (“‘[P]ersonal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person . . . .”).
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While some information is not identifiable to any specific person, other
information is identifiable to multiple persons. Child abuse dramatically
illustrates the point. The fact of abuse is a fact about the child and the abuser.
The privacy definition proposed in this Article accommodates this typically
overlooked wrinkle. Any disclosure of the abuse reduces the privacy of both
parties. As discussed below (Section II.D), this simple example wreaks
havoc with information-control definitions of privacy.
In sum, privacy is concerned with information about oneself. It ties into
control over that information but, as explained in the next Sections, there are
problems with the information-control definition beyond the need to define
the information that matters. Those critiques require substantial adjustments,
not just refinement, to the popular information-control conceptualization of
privacy.
C. Differentiating a Right to Privacy from Privacy
There are two serious problems with control of information as a
definition of privacy: (1) it conflates the right with the thing protected, and
(2) it captures both privacy and the opposite of privacy. Both problems must
be resolved in any viable privacy definition. The first problem is addressed
in this Section. The second is discussed in the next Section.
Controlling information is important to privacy, but it does not define
privacy itself. This objection is crystallized in the observation that the ability
to control information is “neither necessary nor sufficient” for privacy. 174
Someone can have total control over information about themselves and no
privacy. For example, contestants on the reality television show Big Brother
voluntarily choose to live in public view.175 These individuals start with the
same control as everyone else but end up with little privacy. A less
exaggerated variation on this theme is the myriad individuals who post
personal pictures and stories on social media. These individuals lose privacy
but their control over the information they shared was the problem (not the
solution).
Similarly, many people have lots of privacy despite little control over
information. The two classic examples are Fried’s “lonely man on a desert
island” and Beate Rössler’s person-who-falls-into-a-crevasse.176 Both
unfortunate individuals have substantial privacy, but not because they
174 Skopek, supra note 153, at 702 n.40; Austin, supra note 149, at 58 (noting a similar concern);
Parent, supra note 88, at 327 (expressing a similar critique).
175 About Big Brother, CBS.COM, https://www.cbs.com/shows/big_brother/about/ [https://perma.cc/
BRQ9-DS7Q] (“Big Brother follows a group of people living together in a house outfitted with dozens
of high-definition cameras and microphones recording their every move, 24 hours a day.”).
176 Fried, supra note 150, at 482; BEATE RÖSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 7 (2005).
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control information about themselves. Again, these extreme examples
resonate with another more prevalent category: individuals, perhaps most of
us, who are largely anonymous due to broad disinterest in the details of our
lives.
This dilemma reveals a common conceptual error in the effort to define
privacy: the failure to distinguish a condition or state of privacy from a claim
or right to that state. Westin, Fried, and others who offer control over
personal information as a definition of privacy define the wrong thing. The
ability to control information about yourself is not a formula for defining
privacy. It is an effort to define a right to privacy. As the Big Brother
contestants and the crevasse-dweller illustrate, the fact that a person can (or
cannot) control information about themselves, tells us little about the degree
of privacy they actually enjoy.
There is always a distinction between the right to something and the
thing itself. For example, we often speak of a “right to remain silent.”177 That
right is operationalized by one’s control over speaking to authorities.178 But
the right and the thing protected (silence) are not the same. The right offers
a choice: to speak or not to speak. Whether silence results depends on the
choice made. Similarly, the First Amendment guarantees a right to free
speech. Having the right to speak freely does not mean we say anything. Lisa
Austin finds a similar distinction in a generous “re-reading” of Westin’s
views on privacy. She explains: “When we make a claim of privacy, what
we claim is that it is up to us to choose the balance between privacy and
disclosure. But what we choose when we choose privacy is a state of
privacy.”179 Ruth Gavison offers a similar take that is less friendly to Westin.
Gavison concludes that we should “reject attempts to describe privacy as a
claim,” and “[f]or the same reasons, another description that should be
rejected is that of privacy as a form of control.”180
The often-overlooked distinction between the right and the thing
protected provides helpful insight into a variety of privacy dilemmas. For
one thing, this distinction offers an opening for those seeking to bring
normative heft to privacy discourse. As discussed in the preceding Section,
privacy should be defined neutrally. But remaining neutral on privacy does
not necessitate neutrality on the right to privacy or its application in common
contexts. Again, this parallels the typical treatment of other rights. We often
seek to protect rights without prejudging the desirability of their exercise.
The constitutional right to privacy cases illustrate the point. One can argue
177
178
179
180

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966).
See id.
Austin, supra note 149, at 59.
Gavison, supra note 26, at 425–26.
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for a right to access contraception, for example, without taking a position on
how frequently, if at all, individuals should exercise that right.
In addition, the distinction highlighted above directs scholars
evaluating new policies or technologies to focus not on reductions of privacy
but on changes in privacy rights as manifested by individuals’ inability to
prevent privacy losses. This explains why voluntary services like Facebook
or Instagram are less problematic from a privacy perspective than cell phone
location tracking. A person’s decision to share a “selfie” on Facebook does
not violate that person’s right to privacy, just like a person’s decision to call
911 after an accidental shooting does not violate the caller’s right to remain
silent.
This distinction between a right to privacy and privacy itself also
provides an answer to one of the compelling conundrums in contemporary
privacy debates. Privacy scholars are puzzled by the complacency of
younger generations about sharing personal information.181 To scholars,
millennials do not value privacy rights.182 Yet, with all the modern emphasis
on privacy, there is no obvious explanation for why this would be. The
answer may be that the diagnosis is flawed. Millennials and their successors
(Generation Z)183 may be just as interested as their predecessors in privacy
rights. What has changed is the benefits obtained from waiving those rights.
Privacy is lost, for example, when young people routinely share their
location data with friends and family.184 But this information sharing reduces
loneliness and worry. Privacy scholars, who are experts only on the privacy
costs, may overlook these new benefits. Those who eagerly interact with
privacy-reducing services may not be overlooking the value of privacy
rights. They may simply be recognizing unprecedented benefits from
waiving them.185
181 See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1885 (2013) (asking: “Why are so few people engaging in privacy selfmanagement?”); Teri Dobbins Baxter, Low Expectations: How Changing Expectations of Privacy Can
Erode Fourth Amendment Protection and a Proposed Solution, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 612 (2012)
(reviewing studies).
182 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Privacy: Is There Any Left?, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 87, 102 (2009)
(“[W]e appear to be raising a nation of young people willing to give up their right to privacy before they
even comprehend the value of it.”).
183 Michael Dimock, Defining Generations: Where Millennials End and Generation Z Begins, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-endand-generation-z-begins/ [https://perma.cc/6P5B-Q7K4].
184 See, e.g., Julie Beck, It’s 10 P.M. Do You Know Where Your Friends Are?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 20,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/08/why-people-use-find-my-friends/596386/
[https://perma.cc/9GCD-LA9L].
185 An analogy can be drawn to a situation in which a new police officer replaces an ineffective and
brutal predecessor on a local beat. People may become more cooperative in their dealings with the new
officer without this change reflecting any subjective devaluation of their Fifth Amendment rights.
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D. Preventing, Not Controlling, Disclosure
The second problem with the information-control definition of privacy
is that it encompasses a right to disclose information. The problem is not that
people may decline to exercise their right to control information and thus
lose privacy. It is that people can, and often will, invoke a right to control
personal information to reduce rather than enhance privacy.186
There are countless examples in which control decreases rather than
increases privacy, but interconnected information is the most compelling.
Imagine, for example, that a parent abuses a child. Seen through the prism
of controlling personal information, the child has a right to report the parent’s
action. Few would disagree. But it is absurd to refer to this right to disclose
personal information, as Westin, Fried, Austin, and others apparently would,
as the child’s “right to privacy.” Certainly, the parent’s right to privacy is
implicated in this scenario, but the child’s right to disclose this personal
information is something different.
A coherent definition of a right to privacy must distinguish the right to
prevent disclosure of personal information from its opposite, the right to
disclose. A right to privacy, then, is not “the claim of individuals . . . to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others” (Westin),187 or “the control we have over
information about ourselves” (Fried),188 or the ability “to choose the balance
between privacy and disclosure” (Austin).189 It is a right to prevent disclosure
of information about ourselves.190
At this point we seem to have fallen into the same trap (crevasse?) that
snared Westin, Fried, and others, defining the right but not the thing itself.
But awareness of the trap makes all the difference. Defining the right to
privacy takes us directly to a definition of privacy. While the right and the
thing protected are not the same, they should exhibit a direct connection.
Privacy should be what results when we exercise our right to privacy. Thus,
the right to privacy crafted above (“a right to prevent disclosure of

186 Cf. ALLEN, supra note 65, at 26 (“Since a person can exercise control over access in the direction
of making herself more accessible rather than less accessible, privacy itself cannot be identified with
control over access.”).
187 WESTIN, supra note 2, at 7.
188 Fried, supra note 150, at 482.
189 Austin, supra note 149, at 59.
190 Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (characterizing an aspect of privacy as an “interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” (emphasis added)).
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information about ourselves”)191 points the way to a definition of privacy.
Fried almost got it when he wrote: “Privacy is not simply an absence of
information about us in the minds of others . . . .”192 The only error was the
“not.”
This brings us to the main course: the baseline definitions that are the
subject of this Article.
•
•

A right to privacy is the ability to prevent disclosure of
information about ourselves to others.
Privacy is the absence of information about us in the minds of
others.

The next Sections illustrate the power of these definitions to build out a
theory of privacy and clarify the terms’ role and importance in modern policy
debates.
III. A THEORY OF PRIVACY
The definitions developed in Part II lay the foundation for a theory of
privacy. This Part begins to develop that theory. It starts by leveraging the
definitions to respond to reductionist claims that privacy is not a distinct
interest. Next, it distinguishes “access,” a related but ultimately distinct
privacy-adjacent concept. Finally, it elaborates on the meaning of
“disclosure,” a key multilayered facet of the proposed definition.
A. Pure Privacy
A viable definition of privacy should possess two characteristics. It
should capture everything that truly constitutes privacy, and it should leave
out everything else. This is exactly what the reductionists say the current
conception lacks.193 Invocations of “privacy,” they charge, introduce no new
interests, instead borrowing bits and pieces from other rights to unnecessarily
complicate an already cluttered rights landscape.194 “Probably the most

191 This framing parallels some state law privacy protections. See, e.g., ACS Sys., Inc. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins., 147 Cal. App. 4th 137, 149 (2007); Motorists Mut. Ins. v. Dandy-Jim, Inc.,
912 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (similar right under Ohio state constitution). However, these
treatments tend to be conclusory, rather than definitional, and typically limit their coverage to sensitive
information. See, e.g., John B. v. Super. Ct., 38 Cal. 4th 1177, 1198 (2006) (noting application to “sexual
relations” and “medical records”).
192 Fried, supra note 150, at 482. For a definitional approach that appears to resonate with the one
proposed here, see Skopek, supra note 27, at 2189 (arguing that “a privacy loss occurs when true
information about a person is accessed by another via a means that has epistemic merit”).
193 See Gavison, supra note 26, at 422 (discussing variations in reductionists who “are united in
denying the utility of thinking and talking about privacy as a legal right”).
194 Id.
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famous reductionist view” comes from Judith Jarvis Thomson,195 who wrote
that “the right to privacy is everywhere overlapped by other rights.”196
Consequently, Thomson argued, “it is possible to explain in the case of each
right in the cluster how come we have it without ever once mentioning the
right to privacy.”197 The best response to the reductionists is a definition of
privacy that identifies a unique interest that does not depend on other
interests.198 A definition, in other words, must survive Thomson’s critique.
The path forward begins with the recognition that some of Thomson’s
critique is sound. Thomson accurately identified uses of “privacy” in public
and academic discourse that are completely derivative of other values or
rights. For example, Thomson argued: “[M]aking a kind of conduct illegal is
infringing on a liberty, and we all of us have a right that our liberties not be
infringed in the absence of compelling need to do so.”199 Although Thomson
only addressed a few of the problematic overlaps in privacy discourse, her
general critique resonates with the decluttering theme.200
The baseline privacy definition proposed in this Article accepts the
spirit of Thomson’s reductionist critique. The definition does not reach out
to capture intrusions on other interests, such as liberty, dignity, autonomy, or
the desire to be free of nuisance.201 These interests must be left out because
in each instance a different right or interest fully explains the perceived
intrusion and does so more convincingly than “privacy.”202
DeCew, supra note 27; Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1078 (describing Thomson’s “particularly
influential essay”).
196 Thomson, supra note 27, at 310, 313–14.
197 Id. at 313.
198 See INNESS, supra note 1, at 38 (emphasizing that only a definition of privacy can mollify the
privacy skeptic).
199 Thomson, supra note 27, at 312; see supra Section II.A (“Distinguishing Liberty From Privacy”).
200 Thomson also critiques the treatment of nuisance as privacy. Thomson, supra note 27, at 310
(rejecting the suggestion that privacy is violated when the “neighbors make a terrible racket” or “cook
foul-smelling stews”); cf. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 194 (noting that the “law of nuisance”
offered protection “against offensive noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and excessive vibration”).
201 Cf. Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 38 (1967) (distinguishing
“weak senses of ‘privacy’” where the term “is used . . . as a synonym for another [more fitting] term”
from “‘privacy’ in the strong sense,” for which “there is no exact synonym” (emphasis omitted)).
202 David Sklansky argues for a broad definition to account for enhanced harms in street frisks and
strip and home searches. Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1102–06, 1115–18. He correctly notes that it is
difficult to capture the nature of these invasions through an information privacy lens. Id. at 1102–06. The
answer, though, is not to expand the term privacy, as in Sklansky’s conception of privacy as “a zone of
personal sovereignty” or private “refuge.” Id. at 1113. It is to recognize that other overlapping values can
aggravate privacy harms. A home search entails a paradigmatic property invasion. The strip search and
street frisk involve severe intrusions on liberty as well as privacy. Sklansky is right to object to dignity as
the answer in these cases, as “dignity is an even vaguer term than privacy.” Id. at 1106. But dignity offers
a clue as to what is driving the enhanced harms. Dignity, in this context, is a recognition that certain
195
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Ultimately, of course, the proposed baseline definition parts ways with
Thomson and the reductionists by identifying a core of pure privacy
alongside a corresponding claim that this core cannot be explained by other
interests. Although not addressing this definition specifically, Thomson
characterized even interests that would be captured in the proposed definition
as something other than privacy.
My disagreement with Thomson can be framed through one of
Thomson’s primary examples, “a man who owns a pornographic picture”:
He wants that nobody but him shall ever see that picture—perhaps because he
wants that nobody shall know that he owns it, perhaps because he feels that
someone else’s seeing it would drain it of power to please. So he keeps it locked
in his wall-safe, and takes it out to look at only at night or after pulling down
the shades and closing the curtains.203

With a nod toward the Lord of the Rings trilogy, let’s call Thomson’s
unnamed man “Gollum.”204 Looking at our proposed definition, Gollum’s
claim sounds in privacy. His possession of the picture is a fact about himself,
and his desire to conceal that fact from others is squarely captured by our
definition and its accompanying right to prevent the disclosure of facts about
ourselves.
Thomson contended that Gollum’s rights in this context are actually
property rights that flow from his ownership and possession of the picture.205
She extended this conception to information about a person’s body and
(presumably) activities, such as “your right that your left knee not be touched
or looked at,” which she places under the broad heading of “the right over
the person.”206 “For if we have fairly stringent rights over our property, we
have very much more stringent rights over our own persons.”207 For
Thomson, even information privacy claims mask these property and
personhood rights. This leads to Thomson’s reductionist conclusion: “The
question arises, then, whether or not there are any rights in the right to
privacy cluster which aren’t also in some other right cluster. I suspect there

liberty interests resonate beyond the physical intrusion. These invasions sometimes overlap with privacy
as in the strip-search example, but it is not because privacy and dignity are inherently linked. Similar
indignities occur without privacy implications, such as forcing persons to wear embarrassing clothes or
painful symbols, barring religious accessories such as yarmulkes or veils, or desecrating gravesites.
203 Thomson, supra note 27, at 298.
204 Gollum, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gollum [https://perma.cc/8AYA-XXHH]
(noting Gollum’s similar attachment to his ring).
205 Thomson, supra note 27, at 298–303.
206 Id. at 303–05.
207 Id. at 303.
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aren’t any, and that the right to privacy is everywhere overlapped by other
rights.”208
Thomson’s provocative claim has haunted privacy scholarship for fifty
years.209 But her arguments do not undermine the proposed baseline
definition. Thomson’s alternative explanations for the rights protected by
this definition⎯property and “the right over the person”210⎯fall away under
scrutiny while privacy remains.
Particularly problematic for Thomson’s property-rights account is that
there is little correlation between the strength of the property rights and the
corresponding privacy interests. For example, if Gollum only rented or stole
the picture, his property right decreases but his privacy interest remains
unchanged. In some circumstances, the diminution of his property right
actually increases the privacy intrusion that occurs when the picture is
revealed to be in his possession.
In fact, Gollum’s privacy claim remains intact no matter how far we
reduce the property right, including a reduction to zero.211 For example,
replace the pornographic picture with assorted crumbs of food scattered
across the floor or a spill of water in Gollum’s apartment. Gollum’s desire to
keep others unaware of this embarrassing mess again sounds in privacy. Yet
it gets harder to frame the interest as deriving from a property right to the
crumbs or spilled water.
We can push the point further. Say Gollum, who is a bit of a slob, is
employed by a robotics company selling automated cleaning robots. As part
of his sales shtick, he routinely sings the praises of his own tireless
“Roomba.”212 In fact, Gollum does not own a Roomba. His understandable
desire to keep the world ignorant of the absence of a Roomba among his
possessions sounds neatly in privacy. Yet it is impossible to characterize this
claim as a component of a property right in the Roomba that he does not
own.
One might respond that the property right shifts in these circumstances
to the apartment itself. But, again, we can test this by weakening Gollum’s
property interest in the apartment to see if his privacy right retains similar
force. Maybe Gollum is a squatter or guest in someone else’s apartment. Or

208

Id. at 310, 313–14 (emphasis omitted).
See Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1044
(2018) (discussing influence).
210 Thomson, supra note 27, at 305.
211 Cf. INNESS, supra note 1, at 33 (countering Thomson with an example of love letters in which the
author no longer possesses a property interest but maintains a privacy interest).
212 Roomba Robot Vacuums, IROBOT, https://www.irobot.com/roomba [https://perma.cc/Z8TU32YG].
209
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the apartment is a cave on someone else’s land. Even when Gollum’s
property rights fall to zero, a substantial portion of his privacy interest
remains.213
The harder we look, the more it appears that Gollum’s claim to prevent
disclosure of various facts does not depend on a property interest. Say
Gollum walks out of the messy borrowed apartment that has no Roomba and
accidentally crushes a butterfly on the sidewalk with his shoe, while farting.
His claim that no one should know of the mess, his nonpossession of a
Roomba, the butterfly’s fate, and who farted all fit neatly into a value we call
privacy. It takes exhaustive mental gymnastics to characterize any of these
interests as property based. The same is true for Warren and Brandeis’s
primary (and dated) example of a privacy interest in The Right to Privacy of
a man “not din[ing] with his wife on a certain day.”214 Thomson might try at
this point to switch to the more elusive “right over the person” source (which
she concedes is “not mentioned when we give lists of rights”).215 But that
right only applies to these examples in one specific form—a right to prevent
disclosure of facts about ourselves. And it is that right, I think, that we can
comfortably call privacy and nothing else.
This is not to deny that privacy rights often arise in concert with other
rights. For example, one of Julie Inness’s key examples is a person who hides
under the bed to avoid the gaze of a “peeping Tom.” Inness correctly
contends that no one should have to go to such lengths to preserve privacy.216
But the same scenario becomes humorous, not horrific, when it occurs in a
mattress store. Why? Because the privacy invasion in Inness’s example
strongly overlaps with an invasion of the occupant’s property rights. Thus,
Thomson is correct that property and privacy rights can overlap. But contrary
to Thomson, they do not always overlap. And even when multiple rights are
implicated simultaneously, there is often a distinct element that is only
privacy.
Police–citizen encounters offer an important example of overlapping
but distinct rights. A series of rights come into play when a police officer
stops someone on the street and commands them to reveal what is in their
cupped hands. The officer infringed on the suspect’s liberty by virtue of the
stop and any subsequent physical contact or commands. Perhaps the officer
targeted the suspect based on race or class, implicating equality rights. The
213 Gollum’s privacy interest may be overridden in some scenarios by the owner’s property rights.
But that only reveals that privacy rights can be overridden, not their absence. And even in those scenarios,
Gollum’s privacy interests remain intact against the rest of the world.
214 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 201.
215 Thomson, supra note 27, at 305.
216 See INNESS, supra note 1, at 62.
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suspect’s dignity suffers as well. But on top of all this, there is an additional
privacy harm. By coercing the disclosure of a fact about the suspect—
revealing what is in the suspect’s hands (even if it is nothing at all)—the
officer caused an additional harm that is not overlapped by any of the others.
That harm is pure privacy.
B. A Reductionist Critique of “Access”
Identifying a discrete and definable privacy interest provides insight
into a prominent alternative conceptualization of privacy. Some of the most
thoughtful writing on this topic, including the works of Anita Allen, Ruth
Gavison, and David Sklansky, conceptualize privacy in terms of “access.”217
Gavison, for example, contends that people lose privacy not just when
information about them is disclosed but also “when others gain physical
access to them.”218 She offers intuitive examples like shared office space or
a park bench, where “the essence of the complaint is not that more
information about us has been acquired, nor that more attention has been
drawn to us, but that our spatial aloneness has been diminished.”219
To my mind, an interest in “spatial aloneness” borders the proposed
baseline definition but does not introduce any new privacy interests. Access,
as used by privacy scholars, appears to be a blend of the privacy interest
identified in Part II with a lurking liberty interest. We can distill this mixture
through a reductionist critique of Gavison’s most powerful example: “a
stranger who chooses to sit on ‘our’ bench, even though the park is full of
empty benches.”220
If I am enjoying an afternoon in an empty park, the stranger’s arrival
and bold seating choice reduces both my liberty and privacy. Privacy is
implicated through the stranger’s absorption of information about me, such
as what I am doing, how I smell(!) and look. After all, privacy, as defined in
Part II, involves the disclosure of information to others, and the stranger’s
arrival dramatically increases the frequency of such disclosures when
compared to the previously empty park. As explained below, any additional
invasion caused by my loss of “spatial aloneness” is a deprivation of liberty.
Consequently, there is no need to clutter the privacy definition with an
additional “access” component.

See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 26, at 433; ALLEN, supra note 65, at 15 (“[P]ersonal privacy is a
condition of inaccessibility of the person, his or her mental states, or information about the person to the
senses or surveillance devices of others.”); Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1113 (defining privacy as “respect
for a personal sphere shielded . . . from public inspection and regulation”).
218 Gavison, supra note 26, at 433.
219 Id.
220 Id.
217

501

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

The first clue that privacy (as defined in Part II) and liberty are all that
is involved in Gavison’s example is that if I truly ignore the stranger’s
arrival, and the stranger somehow absorbs no information about me, there
has been no invasion of any interest at all.221 For example, if a second person
sits nearby, little changes. (Any physical danger generated by the stranger’s
arrival can be handled through an interest in my right to bodily integrity or,
more specifically, my right not to be assaulted.)
Few people could completely ignore the stranger. I couldn’t. I might
even leave the bench. These influences, however, reflect familiar restrictions
on liberty. The liberty infringement operates both externally and internally.
Most obviously, there is an external constraint: I can no longer put my legs
up on the bench or gesticulate wildly. This harm would be identical if
generated by some inanimate obstruction or a rule prohibition. Internally, I
likely curtail my activities out of politeness (I stop picking my nose), shame
(I turn off my Taylor Swift mix), or fear (I put away my cocaine).222 Although
less obvious, this too is an intrusion on my liberty. Imagine the stranger sat
down and said, “Put away your cocaine or I will call the police.” This slight
variation, applicable to each change in my behavior, makes the internal
constraint into an external one. But the constraint has the same nature. Once
articulated, the liberty infringement is clear. That the stranger accomplished
the same restrictions implicitly rather than explicitly (and without real fault)
does not alter the interest at stake: my ability to act according to my
preferences.
Liberty is not alone in the park-bench scenario. Part of the reason I am
not acting according to my preferences has to do with privacy. But we can
completely describe the privacy interest implicated in this scenario through
the proposed baseline definition. The stranger’s arrival both reduces my
current privacy by revealing information about me right now and threatens
future privacy invasion through ongoing revelations. If I respond to the threat
of future privacy invasions by restricting my activities, I lose liberty as well
as privacy. In this respect, my park-bench misfortune differs only in degree
from the many actions I take every day to prevent disclosure. Since privacy
concerns disclosures to others, access is always part of the calculus. I lower
the volume of my conversations to avoid being overheard. I use a password
for my computer. By taking steps to avoid disclosure, I burden my liberty to
protect privacy. These two discrete notions—liberty (freedom of action) and
privacy as defined in Part II (preventing information about me from being
221

Imagine a towering matrix of small, insulated boxes that individuals enter to play virtual-reality
games; everyone is in extreme physical proximity, but the individuals have no awareness of each other’s
presence. Physical proximity becomes irrelevant because the liberty and privacy interests drop out.
222 Note to readers: I do not use cocaine and you shouldn’t either.
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disclosed to another)—are all that is needed to explain the interests
implicated.223 This is not to deny the appeal of spatial aloneness. Instead, the
point is that this appeal does not reflect the arrival of a new interest. Spatial
aloneness is attractive because it is a state where privacy–liberty tradeoffs
are not required.
C. Disclosure
The distinct privacy interest identified in the preceding Sections is
implicated whenever a person seeks to prevent disclosure of information
about themselves. The reason that this short definition captures such a
complex topic is that “disclosure” has great depth. This Section underscores
the many layers of disclosure captured in the proposed privacy definition.
Disclosure is often framed as an on–off toggle switch.224 A person
possesses some personal information (for example, sexual orientation) and
decides whether to disclose it to the world.225 Rarely, however, is the privacy
calculus so straightforward. Countless variations exist along the spectrum
between total secrecy and universal disclosure. This explains the
unpopularity of Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine, which ignores the
enhanced privacy invasions that arise when information disclosed to one
person is transmitted to others, such as the government.226 This is also why
“secrecy,” an often-invoked term in this context, is such a poor synonym for
privacy.227
Disclosure, as used in the proposed baseline definition, involves not just
the initial revelation (intentional or not) of previously unknown information
to another person. It includes every subsequent revelation of that information
to others. As discussed below, this also includes the enhanced understanding
of already revealed information that occurs when multiple bits of information
are strung together to reach a conclusion about an individual.

223 Similarly, a person could sacrifice privacy to protect another interest. For example, imagine a law
that required gun owners to connect tracking devices to their firearms. Those who complied would lose
privacy to protect their right to possess a gun. Those who gave up their guns would protect their privacy.
We might even describe the GPS requirement as an intolerable burden on gun rights, but the GPS tracking
remains a privacy invasion.
224 See, e.g., Boliek, supra note 115, at 1111 (“[O]nce personal information is disclosed, that privacy
is gone forever.”).
225 See, e.g., IGO, supra note 65, at 301 (describing controversy in the 1990s over “outing” of
“prominent politicians and celebrities unwilling to publicly acknowledge their homosexuality”).
226 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”);
Bellin, supra note 130, at 268 (describing the third-party doctrine).
227 Cf. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is not a discrete commodity,
possessed absolutely or not at all.”).
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We rarely completely hide information.228 Since we generally disclose,
or cannot keep concealed, even the most sensitive information about
ourselves, the term “disclosure” must cover more than whether information
has ever been revealed to another person. The disclosure concept includes
the limits we implicitly or explicitly place on the revelation of information
to the broader world. Thus, someone might stand shirtless on the balcony for
a moment but put on a shirt after a neighbor starts taking pictures. Putting on
a shirt is an effort to limit the disclosure of visual information. It is an effort
to increase privacy. Drawing on earlier theorists, Westin analogizes the
various levels of disclosure to a series of “concentric circles” within which
we try to contain different information. “The series continues until it reaches
the outer circles of casual conversation and physical expression that are open
to all observers.”229
The concept of disclosure is further complicated by uncertainty. When
we disclose information, we can only estimate the spread ex ante based on
the fact to be disclosed and what we know about our audience. Many
disclosures wither away immediately because the initial recipient finds the
disclosure uninteresting and not worth remembering or repeating. Others
radiate far and wide. Some disclosures are intercepted and spread in ways
we could not anticipate. Greater uncertainty decreases the likelihood that we
will be able to prevent unintended disclosures of information about ourselves
to others. This is why notice about how information will be used is an
important tool for enhancing privacy rights. Notice makes it easier to prevent
the disclosure of information about ourselves by forecasting the disclosures
that will follow from an initial revelation.
Privacy’s key ally in the context of disclosure is noise. Most
information is noisy. It reveals something, but exactly what is unclear.
Consequently, it often takes multiple pieces of information to reach a useful
conclusion about an important matter. A red-light camera does not discern
the driver’s identity. The Google-search results by themselves don’t reveal
who searched for “incendiary devices” or why. The water utility doesn’t
know if the residents in a home are taking wasteful showers or growing an
organic garden. Further, since generally no one is auditing our mundane
actions, we can increase noisiness by, for example, using a friend’s account
to stream a movie or using pseudonyms or fabricated information in digital
profiles. Plus, Netflix, Google, and other information magnets store so much
information that any one person or entry is at least momentarily hidden in a
sea of data. Noisiness is not perfect protection, however. The Achilles heel
228 Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (“In
an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another.”).
229 WESTIN, supra note 2, at 33.
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of noise is the possibility that someone will painstakingly configure the bits
and pieces into a meaningful picture.230
Under the conceptual framework set out above, every accurate
disclosure of information about a person decreases that person’s privacy.
This includes every additional person to whom information is disclosed and
every enhancement (or decrease in noise) of initially revealed information.
When we protect peoples’ privacy rights, we offer them the ability to prevent
disclosures of information about themselves. This includes the ability to
prevent: (1) an initial disclosure or revelation, which often requires accurate
notice of the scope of disclosure involved in any revelation, and (2) any
subsequent disclosures, including clearer understandings of already-revealed
information.
Although there may be some value in teasing out each of the disclosure
scenarios, the underlying interest is always the same. The central concern of
privacy is the disclosure of individually identifiable information.231 How we
perceive a resulting privacy reduction depends as much on the nature of the
information disclosed and its justification as it does on the particular
mechanics of “disclosure” involved.232 Disclosure can occur through the
prying of outsiders, the repetition of already-disclosed information, or
careful efforts that connect various bits of information to reveal an otherwise
unknown fact. In each case, when someone learns a fact about another
person, that person’s privacy decreases. Consequently, the baseline
definition proposed above can rely on the rich term “disclosure” to capture
the broad array of potential privacy losses.
IV. CLARIFYING POLICY DEBATES
A precise privacy definition offers numerous benefits. A few have
already been illustrated. The definition highlights the importance of focusing
legal scrutiny on the loss of privacy rights rather than reductions in privacy
itself.233 It also provides a much-needed response to reductionist critiques.234
Revealing a core of pure privacy that is not “everywhere overlapped by other
rights”235 explains why privacy should have a seat at the table for policy
debates.

230

See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1721 (2010) (emphasizing “ease” of de-anonymization).
231 See supra Section III.A.
232 Cf. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 155 (2004)
(similarly noting “several variables” that play a role in this calculus).
233 See supra Section II.C.
234 See supra Section III.A.
235 Thomson, supra note 27, at 310.
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Having established that privacy should be part of the policy
conversation, a clear definition also fosters a more rigorous framework for
thinking about privacy in those debates. When a policy or technology is
challenged on privacy grounds, a concrete definition permits a clear
assessment of both the nature of the challenge and its normative strength. A
definition tells us what it is we are protecting, which in turn sheds light on
how best to offer that protection. Often, this additional precision highlights
ways to directly address (or even solve) privacy problems, rather than the
more traditional framing of balancing privacy versus other values. Other
times, precision uncovers a privacy proxy war, where different interests,
such as liberty or equality, animate a purported “privacy” challenge. This
insight increases the likelihood of striking the appropriate policy balance
between a new technology or practice and the status quo. To illustrate the
clarifying value of a definition of privacy, this Part analyzes common
scenarios in which “privacy” framings mask other interests, leading to
unproductive debate and poor policy.
The most common privacy proxy wars involve abuse-of-power
concerns, including fears of government oppression and losses of individual
liberty. These proxy wars arise in both abstract academic arguments and
concrete policy debates.
The unproductive conflation of interests in academic discourse is most
apparent in “ubiquitous” privacy claims that invoke George Orwell’s
dystopian novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four.236 Totalitarian governments, like
Oceania, the state villain in Nineteen Eighty-Four, have numerous vices.
These vices are magnified by illegitimate state goals. People understandably
recoil when they are told that a policy will set us on the road to Nineteen
Eighty-Four. Oceania routinely lies to its people and kills and tortures them
(with rats!). The ruling party does all this, Orwell explains, “for its own
sake.”237 And Oceania is led by “Big Brother,” who, the saying goes, is
always watching. The hellscape of Nineteen Eighty-Four implicates actual
privacy (surveillance), big-tent privacy (liberty, propaganda, lack of human
flourishing), and a bunch of interests that no one even claims are privacy
(diabolical torture, murder, rats). Allusions to Nineteen Eighty-Four blend
all these interests together, complicating any assessment of the strength of
the objection and potential solutions. Decades ago, Westin advised privacy
236 See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1076 & n.27 (describing how, starting in the 1960s,
“[s]cholars and popular writers alike linked totalitarianism with an absence of privacy; it became
common, even ubiquitous, to cite George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four for what life would look like if
attacks on privacy were not resisted”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1153 (2004) (“It is the rare privacy advocate who resists citing
Orwell when describing these dangers.”).
237 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 252 (1949).
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advocates to “forsak[e] Orwellian imagery for hard facts.”238 The advice
continues to go unheeded.239
A definitional lens reveals the same obfuscating phenomenon in policy
debates. Modern “privacy” objections often mask worries about abuse of
power, not the inability to prevent disclosure of information about ourselves.
For example, the ACLU’s objections to Ring video doorbells note that while
“individuals . . . have a right to photograph their property in front of their
front door[,] . . . more pervasive private cameras do erode our privacy.”240
The ACLU’s official guidance, however, cautions consumers not about any
problematic privacy losses, but instead against “contribut[ing] to the creation
of a broad surveillance infrastructure in your community that may be used in
abusive ways.”241 This framing regularly appears in analogous policy
debates. A recent article about police drones characterizes the privacy
objection as follows: “For privacy advocates . . . the concern is that
increasingly powerful technology will be used to target parts of the
community — or strictly enforce laws that are out of step with social
norms.”242 Again, in the debate about one of the most controversial “privacyinvading surveillance technolog[ies],”243 automated facial recognition, “civil
liberty groups have expressed unease about the technology’s potential abuse
by government amid fears that it may shove the United States in the direction
of an overly oppressive surveillance state.”244
Although the term “privacy” is invariably invoked when the
government considers new technologies, the common thread in most modern
critiques is abuse of power. The problem is not that a police drone records
someone dropping a gun in a trash can245 or that a technology tentatively
matches surveillance footage to a driver’s-license photo (and does so
especially poorly for African Americans).246 The concern is that the more
238

WESTIN, supra note 2, at 4.
See sources cited supra note 236.
240 Jay Stanley, Should You Buy a Ring Doorbell Camera?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/blog/
privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/should-you-buy-ring-doorbell-camera [https://perma.cc/
6X5U-BKEL].
241 Id.
242 Cade Metz, Police Drones Are Starting to Think for Themselves, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/05/technology/police-drones.html [https://perma.cc/X3FB-RVAF].
243 Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognition-misidentify-jail.html
[https://perma.cc/99CZ-AV9W].
244 Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition
Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognitionban-san-francisco.html [https://perma.cc/R9CL-TKJC].
245 See Metz, supra note 242.
246 See Hill, supra note 243.
239
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crimes the government detects (or thinks it detects), the more people’s liberty
is jeopardized.247 The disclosure of information is part of this equation, but
the primary concern is overpolicing (and a resulting loss of liberty), not
privacy. The “privacy” objections quoted above flow more naturally into
low-tech reforms that have little privacy resonance, such as reducing the
number of police officers, narrowing the scope of criminal law, and
dismantling mass incarceration. The giveaway in the quoted statements is
that the “surveillance state” is a problem because it is “abusive” and “overly
oppressive,” not because it detects information. It’s Oceania’s government,
not its surveillance cameras, that we are worried about. That’s why China,248
not Orwell’s native England,249 is the usual real-world villain in modern
privacy debates, even though “Britain is one of the most heavily surveilled
nations on earth, with an estimated one surveillance camera per 11
citizens.”250 “Privacy” in these contexts has become a proxy for an argument
that the U.S. government, like Oceania, is too powerful and likely to use its
power for nefarious ends. It’s an important argument. But it’s not usefully
considered under the rubric of “privacy.”
Precision matters. Using the wrong term clouds important policy
debates and increases the chances of miscalculating complex tradeoffs. The
problem is apparent in a variety of areas, such as longstanding resistance to
automating traffic enforcement. When cities started installing red-light
cameras decades ago, critics, such as the one-time Majority Leader of the
House of Representatives, blasted the cameras as “an ‘Orwellian’ threat to
privacy.”251 The objection is familiar. And again, the fight is about
overpolicing and abuse of power, not privacy.
247

See id.
See Anna Mitchell & Larry Diamond, China’s Surveillance State Should Scare Everyone,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/china-surveillance/
552203/ [https://perma.cc/D97G-ZWY9]; Conger et al., supra note 244 (pointing to tracking of Uighurs,
an ethnic group in China primarily composed of Muslims, as basis for banning facial-recognition
technology); Paul Mozur, Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
8,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillancetechnology.html [https://perma.cc/ZJ6B-QDTD].
249 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and
the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 848 n.601 (1995) (“The Orwellian archetype also gathers some
of its power from the existence of surveillance states such as North Korea, the People’s Republic of China
(at least in some times and regions), and the former Soviet Union.”).
250 Ellen Barry, From Mountain of CCTV Footage, Pay Dirt: 2 Russians Are Named in Spy
Poisoning, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/world/europe/salisburynovichok-poisoning.html [https://perma.cc/W782-TSVB].
251 Valerie Alvord, Critics of Red-Light Cameras Laud Ruling, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2001, at A3,
ProQuest, Doc. No. 408878840 (“[T]he programs are under siege from critics, including House Majority
Leader Dick Armey, who say they are unconstitutional and are an ‘Orwellian’ threat to privacy.”); Joe
248
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Looking at automated traffic enforcement through an overpolicing as
opposed to a “privacy” lens turns the policy debate on its head. Automated
traffic enforcement may decrease privacy, but it would likely reduce rather
than enhance oppression.252 The alternative to automated enforcement is not
a free pass to violate traffic laws. It is a different, sometimes lethal,
enforcement mechanism that history suggests is more threatening to liberty
and equality than cameras: discretionary roadside stops by armed police.253
In fact, there may be few policy interventions more beneficial to individual
liberty than removing armed police from traffic enforcement. Nobody likes
to get a ticket in the mail. But people get killed during traffic stops.254 Police
know this better than anyone. One of the most radical statements in the
debates referenced above comes from a police officer who explains that the
benefit of using drones is that they “limit [police officers’] exposure to other
people.”255 What the officer knows but advocates tend to overlook is that
someone is going to answer the 911 call about the man with a gun. A drone
that can immediately signal “false alarm” may be preferable to three squad
cars racing to the scene filled with nervous police holding loaded weapons.
Disagree? It’s a debate worth having. Most importantly, that debate doesn’t
benefit from a “privacy” overlay, particularly if privacy remains undefined.
The overlay may even be counterproductive. As things stand, privacy
victories keep us safe from becoming Oceania, but they may also prevent us
from becoming more like England, where ubiquitous public cameras can
displace traditional policing.256

Conlon, Note, A Missouri Citizen’s Guide to Red Light Cameras, 80 MO. L. REV. 197, 217 (2015)
(discussing objections “to the use of red light cameras on the grounds of privacy” by those who “do not
want ‘Big Brother’ snooping around their lives”).
252 See I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1271 (2017)
(arguing that “more public surveillance cameras” could “deracialize and de-bias policing”).
253 See Wesley Lowery, A Disproportionate Number of Black Victims in Fatal Traffic Stops, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-disproportionate-number-of-blackvictims-in-fatal-traffic-stops/2015/12/24/c29717e2-a344-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html [https://
perma.cc/5UGC-ARS4]; cf. Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 211 (2015)
(criticizing “the technopanic that currently shapes privacy debates”).
254 Lowery, supra note 253.
255 Metz, supra note 242.
256 Although there are numerous factors in play, one data point of interest is that England’s police
force killed three people in 2018–2019, about 0.3% of the total in the United States. Number of Fatal
Shootings by Police in England and Wales from 2004/05 to 2018/19, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/319246/police-fatal-shootings-england-wales/ [https://perma.cc/SD8L-YRD6]. For police
killings in the United States, see Police Shootings Database 2015–2021, WASH. POST (May 21, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ [https://perma.cc/
5Z3N-E4TB], and compare Pozen, supra note 4, at 227 (“A police force that devotes significant resources
to surveillance will have fewer resources left over—and perhaps less of a practical need—for
interrogation.”).
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David Pozen similarly bemoans the “privacy-privacy tradeoffs” that
dominate policy debates, where distinct and competing interests are all
obscured under the same “privacy” label.257 As Pozen observes: “It cannot
simply be assumed that because a certain measure causes privacy harm, even
serious harm, privacy would be enhanced overall by jettisoning the
measure.”258 But since Pozen embraces the big-tent approach to privacy, he
overlooks the most elegant solution. The best way to untangle this mess is to
stop calling everything “privacy”259 and precisely identify the distinct
interests at stake.
This pattern of imprecise “privacy” objections clouding the concrete
interests involved repeats in countless contexts, such as in the fight against
COVID-19. In the early days of the COVID-19 crisis, American health
officials’ efforts to trace international arrivals were rebuffed in part due to
the privacy implications of releasing travelers’ names.260 In a second
potentially missed opportunity, the country declined to repurpose existing
cell phone location tracking to isolate the infected and identify those
exposed. This commonsense substitute for outdated manual contact tracing
was “stymied by privacy concerns.”261 Countries such as South Korea took
257

See Pozen, supra note 4, at 222.
Id. at 242; cf. Rosa Ehrenreich, Privacy and Power, 89 GEO. L.J. 2047, 2049 (2001) (“[T]here are
dangers in relying too much on the language of privacy, for the privacy rubric has the potential to obscure
certain kinds of consequential harms that are felt differentially by people in different social and economic
groups.”).
259
See Pozen, supra note 4, at 225 (explaining the pluralistic nature of the conception of “privacy”).
260 See Natalie Kitroeff & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Airlines Refused to Collect Passenger Data That
Could Aid Coronavirus Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/
business/coronavirus-airlines-contact-tracing-cdc.html [https://perma.cc/R49P-EP8L] (reporting that
health officials’ efforts to introduce contact-tracing requirements for the airline industry were “rebuffed”
in part because “Senate aides were concerned about the privacy implications”); Thomas Fuller, How
Much Should the Public Know About Who Has the Coronavirus?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/coronavirus-data-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/LB5T-NZT8]
(“In the perennial tug-of-war between privacy and transparency in the United States, privacy appears to
be winning in the coronavirus pandemic.”).
261 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Coronavirus Apps Show Promise but Prove a Tough Sell, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/07/technology/coronavirus-exposure-alertapps.html [https://perma.cc/Z4QR-ZNYV]; see also Sara Morrison, The United Kingdom’s Contact
Tracing App Could Be a Preview of America’s Digital Tracing Future, VOX (May 6, 2020,
1:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/5/6/21247955/united-kingdom-nhs-contact-tracing-app
[https://perma.cc/L37G-UHU9] (emphasizing privacy concerns as an obstacle to adoption of effective
tracing apps); Kate Murphy, Contact Tracing Is Harder Than It Sounds, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/23/sunday-review/coronavirus-contact-tracing.html [https://perma.
cc/4UEU-DG4F] (describing “contact tracing, which health experts say is essential to containing the
coronavirus”); Virus-Tracing Apps Must Not Be Used for Mass Surveillance: EU Says, REUTERS (May
14, 2020, 5:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-apps/virus-tracing-appsmust-not-be-used-for-mass-surveillance-eu-says-idUSKBN22Q1KA
[https://perma.cc/LMR8-JT3U]
258
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the opposite approach, allowing health officials to get the results of
automated contact tracing “minutes” after learning of a diagnosis.262
In the United States, policymakers waited on developers to create a
more privacy-conscious, voluntary contact-tracing technology.263 By the
time the technology rolled out, the virus was everywhere, and few people
saw the point of downloading a new application that no one was using.264
Looking back, researchers described a privacy Catch-22: “[P]eople want
assurances not only of privacy but also of the technology’s effectiveness
before agreeing to use the apps in large numbers. But privacy protections
make it harder to collect the very data that can show how well the apps
work.”265
One hint that our resistance to cell phone location contact tracing wasn’t
based in privacy (as that term is defined here) is that we never stopped
tracking ourselves. As COVID-19 spread across the country, our cell phones
pinged out our locations to the Weather Channel App, Google Maps, and
Angry Birds.266 Location information remained available to the government

(noting European officials’ assurance that surveillance would be turned off after crisis “to allay concerns
over state surveillance”); Kelly Servick, Cellphone Tracking Could Help Stem the Spread of Coronavirus.
Is Privacy the Price?, SCIENCE (Mar. 22, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/
2020/03/cellphone-tracking-could-help-stem-spread-coronavirus-privacy-price [https://perma.cc/S2PV5DF7] (noting the tension between developing contact tracing and preserving privacy); Craig Timberg &
Drew Harwell, Government Efforts to Track Virus Through Phone Location Data Complicated by
Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2020, 4:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2020/03/19/privacy-coronavirus-phone-data/ [https://perma.cc/G9AF-JJS4] (reporting that collecting
contact-tracing data is complicated “by the legal and ethical issues surrounding government access to
information that can reveal intimate details about citizens’ lives”).
262 Hyonhee Shin, Hyunjoo Jin & Josh Smith, How South Korea Turned an Urban Planning System
into a Virus Tracking Database, REUTERS (May 21, 2020, 11:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-health-coronavirus-southkorea-tracing/how-south-korea-turned-an-urban-planning-systeminto-a-virus-tracking-database-idUSKBN22Y03I [https://perma.cc/N3VN-A9G7] (“People do not have
any choice whether their data is collected and accessed, but officials told Reuters that authorities notify
anyone whose information is gathered and that all the data will be deleted when the virus is contained.”).
263 See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 261 (reporting that “Apple and Google launched an ambitious
effort to harness technology in the fight against Covid-19”).
264 See id.
265 Id.
266 See Alfred Ng, Weather Channel’s Location Data Settlement Doesn’t Mean Much for Your
Privacy, CNET (Aug. 20, 2020, 1:53 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/weather-channels-location-datasettlement-doesnt-mean-much-for-your-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/3DNC-NJW5]; Jennifer ValentinoDeVries, How Your Phone Is Used to Track You, and What You Can Do About It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/technology/smartphone-location-tracking-opt-out.html
[https://perma.cc/LPE7-V96H]; Spies Use Angry Birds and Other Apps to Track People, Documents
Show, CBS NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014, 5:00 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/spies-use-angry-birds-andother-apps-to-track-people-documents-show/ [https://perma.cc/JET8-EE4W].
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too, so long as it used traditional channels.267 As tends to be the case with
modern privacy objections, the status quo survived unscathed. We drew the
line at trying to use existing infrastructure for something new.268 This irony
seemed especially pointed as researchers and reporters regularly tapped cell
phone location data to inform us about the worsening pandemic. For
example, in an article titled Location Data Says It All, Staying at Home
During Coronavirus Is a Luxury,269 New York Times reporters found that
there was wide variance in social distancing by socioeconomic status.270
NBC analyzed data from 15 million cell phones to determine that Americans
were still traveling over Thanksgiving.271 Fascinating stuff. But the public
health officials actually trying to fight the virus’s spread had to make do with
manual contact tracing (i.e., asking sick people questions about where they
had been), a stone-age tool that was quickly overwhelmed.272
The failure to use surveillance technology to combat COVID-19 led to
a classic privacy–privacy tradeoff.273 We avoided a perceived privacy
invasion (automated cell phone contact tracing) but may have ended up
losing more than we gained. Our inability to track people infected with

267 See Wendy Davis, Law Enforcement Is Using Location Tracking on Mobile Devices to Identify
Suspects, but Is It Unconstitutional?, ABA J. (Dec. 1, 2020, 1:50 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/law-enforcement-is-using-location-tracking-on-mobile-devices-to-identify-suspectsgeofence [https://perma.cc/RD2T-TLYT] (explaining the phenomenon of “geofence warrants,” which
allow the government to obtain consumers’ location information from private companies).
268 Cf. Eric Topol, Opinion, How Digital Data Collection Can Help Track Covid-19 Cases in Real
Time, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2020, 4:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/10/
how-digital-data-collection-can-help-track-covid-19-cases-real-time/ [https://perma.cc/ME8H-LVBR]
(“Americans who willingly share their location so their phone apps can help them avoid a traffic jam
might well think the risk, and the trade-offs, are worth it to halt a pandemic.”).
269 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Denise Lu & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Location Data Says It All: Staying
at Home During Coronavirus Is a Luxury, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
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270 See id. (relying on “smartphone location data analyzed by The New York Times”).
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https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/americans-traveled-high-numbers-thanksgiving-cellphonelocation-data-shows-they-n1249860 [https://perma.cc/SGD8-8MKJ] (“NBC News analysis of cellphone
location data [showed] . . . Americans in more than 1,900 counties saw increased rates of closeness during
Thanksgiving travel[] compared to the previous week.”).
272 See Murphy, supra note 261 (reporting on problems with manual contact tracing); Matt Richtel,
Contact Tracing with Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/health/coronavirus-contact-tracing-apps.html [https://perma.cc/
BJ8L-R898] (“The traditional method of contact tracing is time consuming and labor-intensive.”); Ellen
Barry & Ron DePasquale, U.S. Deaths Climb Toward Daily Record, but More People Are Surviving
Infection, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2020, 12:56 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/11/25/world/
covid-19-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/E4LA-DSST] (reporting that “overwhelmed state and local health
officials [were] scaling back . . . contact tracing efforts”).
273 See Pozen, supra note 1, at 222 (discussing privacy–privacy tradeoffs).
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COVID-19 necessitated widespread reductions in liberty and quality of life.
If the concern about cell phone contact tracing and the disclosure of medical
information (a COVID-19 diagnosis) was actually oppression or loss of
liberty (and not “privacy”), we may have made these difficult questions
harder by focusing on the wrong variables.
The point is not to offer answers to the policy choices described above.
Instead, it is to show that our inability to define “privacy” makes hard
questions harder. Precisely defined, pure privacy is an important
consideration in policy debates. As a general matter, more privacy is better
than less. But without a precise definition, shouting “privacy” at problems
forces us to look in many different directions at once, distorting debates that
are better centered on abuse of power, efficacy, and replacement effects.
Sometimes big-tent privacy rhetoric does good work. But other times it
places sensible policies off-limits, diverts attention from more central
concerns, and privileges an ineffective and oppressive status quo. A precise
definition of the term that regularly dominates these debates isn’t the entire
answer, but it is a necessary first step toward clearer thinking and better
solutions.
CONCLUSION
There are over 4,500 law journal articles that use “privacy” in their
titles. A Westlaw search for the string “right to privacy” returns 10,000
judicial opinions, the ceiling on the database. This literature is full of soaring
quotes such as: “Privacy is one of the truly profound values for a civilized
society”274 and “one of the great ideas with which the law has grappled.”275
These accolades for privacy are also interspersed with a common critique.
Thomson wryly observed in 1975 that “[p]erhaps the most striking thing
about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea
what it is.”276 Sadly, “[i]n the forty years since she made this observation, the
literature has made little progress on this front.”277 The problem is not just
academic. The absence of a clear definition of privacy combined with
widespread indifference to its necessity leads to unproductive debate and bad
policy.
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276 Thomson, supra note 27, at 295; cf. Richards, supra note 1, at 1139 (“Privacy’s importance is
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Groundhog Day arrives with each new technology and policy
initiative.278 Scholars and advocates shout “privacy” at legislators, officials,
courts, consumers, and companies. We are constantly cautioned to be on alert
against the ceaseless erosion of privacy. Nineteen Eighty-Four always looms
around the corner. Precisely what must be done and feared is less clear. The
privacy battle echoes across the airwaves with some voices mourning the
“death of privacy”279 and others claiming that exaggerated privacy concerns
cost lives.280 Sometimes privacy wins, sometimes it loses. No patterns
emerge and no victory lasts.
This Article seeks to break the cycle. Legal discourse on privacy cannot
move forward without a definition of the term. Commentators will surely
find flaws with the proposed definition and this Article’s defense of that
definition. But these discussions can bring us closer to a shared
understanding of what we mean by privacy. With the stakes constantly
rising, consensus on the desirability of that goal should be easy to reach. If
we truly care about privacy, it’s time to figure out what it is.

278 See Groundhog Day, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107048/ [https://perma.cc/AM9WV8M5].
279 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000).
280 See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 251 (2008)
(arguing that “[p]rivacy is the terrorist’s best friend”).
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